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JURISDICTION 
The Trial Court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and Order on the 15th day of September, 1993. A timely Notice 
of Appeal was filed October 14, 1993. This Court has jurisdiction 
under Utah Code Annotated 78-2A-3(2)(k). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO DISMISS THE 
PLAINTIFFS CLAIM BASED UPON THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
The Trial Court erred in failing to grant 
Defendant/Appellant's Motion to Dismiss based upon the applicable 
Utah and Texas Statutes of Limitations. 
Standard of Review 
The questions of statutory construction and application are 
questions of law that require no particular deference to the Trial 
Court's interpretation. Roosevelt City v. Nebeker, 815 P.2d 738 
(Utah App. 1991); Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033 
(Utah 1989) . 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE 
PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, 
A. The Trial Court granted Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment based upon the Trial Court's selected facts while ignoring 
other facts which create a genuine issue of fact. 
B. The Trial Court erred in receiving and considering as 
undisputed fact, evidence in violation of the parole evidence rule. 
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C. The Trial Court erred in receiving and considering, as an 
undisputed fact, a document, the consideration of which violated 
the Statute of Frauds. 
Standard of Review 
1. Summary Judgment is appropriate only when no genuine 
issue of material fact exists and it clearly appears that there is 
no reasonable probability that the party moved against can prevail. 
Snyder v. Merkley. 693 P.2d 64 (Utah 1984). 
2 . In determining where the Trial Court correctly found that 
there were no genuine issues of material fact, the Appellate Court 
reviews the facts and all reasonable inferences in a light most 
favorable to the party opposing the motion. It reviews the Trial 
Court's conclusions of law for correctness including its conclusion 
that there are no material fact issues. Schurtz v. BMW of North 
America, Inc. 814 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1991). 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS 
EVIDENCED BY ITS ENTRY OF FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW, THE CONTENTS OF WHICH EVIDENCE MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT. 
Standard of Review 
See paragraphs 1 and 2 above. Mountain States Telephone and 
Telegraph Company v. Atkin, Wright & Miles, Chartered, 681 P.2d 
1258 (Utah 1984) . 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT GARY 
BRIGGS/ MOTION TO JOIN INDISPENSABLE THIRD PARTIES. 
Standard of Review 
The Trial Court reviews questions of law for correctness. 
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Schurtz v. BMW of North America, Inc., supra. 
Statutes 
The text of the following Statutes is as set forth in Addendum 
A attached hereto. UCA, §25-5-4; §70A-8-204; §70A-8-301; §70A-8-
308; §70A-8-313; §70A-8-314; §70A-8-319; §78-12-45; Texas Civil 
Proc. SIV.P; Rem Code §16-003,051; UCA, §48A-2A-1001 et seq. UCA. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. The unverified Complaint of 
Plaintiff seeks recovery of 32,190 shares of stock of Digitran, 
Inc. (See Addendum B) 
The Plaintiff claims that Briggs converted the stock to 
his own use and seeks the return of the shares of stock and/or the 
value of the shares of stock and any benefits or value accruing to 
the shares of stock. 
B. Course of the Proceedings. Briggs filed an answer and an 
amended answer to Plaintiff's Complaint. Plaintiff took Briggs' 
Deposition. The deposition, together with 34 exhibits and an 
affidavit of Plaintiff were submitted to the Court for decision 
upon the Plaintiff's and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
C. Disposition in the Trial Court. The District Court of 
Cache County, the Honorable Gordon J. Low presiding, granted 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and entered Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law and denied the Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment to dismiss the complaint. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1981 Gary M. Briggs, a resident of the State of California in 
1981 purchased a unit of a Louisiana limited partnership known as 
"Crane Development, Ltd. Partnership"** (Depo. TR 6, 1. 12) (Ex. 
1) 
The consideration for the Limited Partnership Unit was 
$128,632 of which $57,750 was cash. (Depo. 10, 1. 25) In addition 
to the cash contribution to Crane Development, Briggs was required 
to execute a promissory note in the amount of $70,882.00 to the 
partnership, due and payable on November 30, 1990. (Depo. TR p. 
11) The purchase of the limited partnership unit occurred in 
Louisiana. (Depo. 14) Crane Development had a research on the 
development agreement with Digitran,m Inc. 
1986 On April 1, 1986, Digitran, Inc. offered to discount the 
note payable to Crane Development Ltd. Partnership in exchange for 
the sum of $30,400 for each unit as full payment of the 1990 note 
and stock in Digitran, Inc. The offer was made by Loretta Records, 
President, Digitran, Inc. (Ex. 1(a), Depo. p. 21 - 24) Defendant, 
on April 30, 1986, exercised the option to prepay the 1990 note and 
tendered the sum of $30,400 to Digitran, Inc. (Ex. 2, Depo. p. 25 
1. 24; p. 26) 
* Depo. refers to the deposition of Gary Briggs. Plaintiffs affidavit refers to Plaintiffs Affidavit on 
file. Ex. refers to Deposition Exhibits. Rec. refers to record. 
The purpose of Crane Development Ltd was to conduct R&D for the creation of simulator 
technology for large crane operations. The Defendant, Briggs claims the Plaintiff has converted the technology 
for her entity Digitran, Inc. without paying any royalty for the use of the technology. 
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As cited above as additional consideration of the prepayment 
of the note by Briggs, Digitran, Inc. agreed to issue to the 
limited partners a number of shares in Digitran, Inc. at a market 
price of 75C per share. (Depo. Ex. 2) The stock to be issued to 
Gary Briggs should have been 40,533 shares. The stock was not 
delivered by Digitran, Inc. to Briggs as agreed. (Ex. 3, 4; Depo. 
p. 42, 1. 14 - 20; Depo. 43, 1. 13 - 17) 
1987 - 1988 Gary Briggs then a resident of Colorado, between 
May of 1987 through February of 1988, went to the office of 
Digitran, Inc. in Louisiana. Gary Briggs was an employee of 
Merrill-Lynch. Plaintiff, Loretta Penfold Records fixes the date 
as October 8, 1987. (PI. Aff., Rec. 124) 
Gary Briggs describes the conversation prior to the delivery 
of the stock and irrevocable stock power as expressing concerns 
that Digitran was having numerous problems meeting its obligations 
relative to Crane Partnership. (Depo. TR 42) There were problems 
with the payment of royalties by Digitran/Digicrane to the 
partnership. (TR 43) Briggs had not received his stock from 
Digitran as agreed. (Depo. 42)*** 
Note: Defendant's counsel's objection as written in the 
record based upon the Parole Evidence Rule. (TR 44, 1. 1) 
By reason of the defaults of Digitran, Inc., Loretta Records 
delivered to Gary Briggs 32,190 shares of her personal stock and 
Briggs purchased a unit of Crane Development. Crane Development had an agreement with 
Digitran, Inc. or Digicrane to provide research and development funds to Digitran-Digicrane in exchange for 
royalties to be paid to the partnership. 
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irrevocable stock power (Addendum B). Gary Briggs describes his 
understanding of the transactions as his option to use the stock as 
he felt necessary to fulfill the unpaid debts relative to Digicrane 
Digitran. (TR 44, 1. 21 - 25) The conversations between the 
parties over Brigg's counsel's objection was as follows: 
TR 42: 
Q: So somewhere in 1987 or early 1988 when you received the stock 
certificate identified as Exhibit 6, can you tell me under what 
circumstances it was received? 
A: There had been numerous problems relative to performance on the 
part of Digitran - Digicrane and obligations relative to the Crane 
partnership and the repayment offer that I had subscribed to and 
this document. The original of the document represented by Exhibit 
6 was given to me by Loretta Records as security that the good 
faith performance would be followed by Digitran/Digicrane. 
TR 43: 
A: There were problems relative to royalties. There would have 
been numerous lack of good faith efforts on the part of Digitran -
Digicrane and when this stock was given to me it was not 
specifically related to the issuance of 40,000 shares connected 
with the prepayment. 
TR 44: 
Q: The discussions you have had with Loretta Records which led to 
the delivery of this stock certificate on Exhibit 6 was there a 
clear understanding in your mind as to what a good faith 
performance would be? I am referring back to your earlier 
statement that this was to be security that good faith performance 
would be followed through. 
A: No. 
Q: So it was unclear as to what was good faith performance? 
A: That is correct. 
Q: Let me ask you, what do you mean by security, when you use the 
word security? Does that imply that this stock was for you to take 
and use for your own from that point forward? 
A: I would have the option to use it as my own if I felt it 
necessary to fulfill unpaid debts relative to Digitran/Digicrane. 
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Q: Was it your option? 
A: Yes. 
Q: What would trigger the option? 
A: There was no specific trigger that was identified. 
TR 45: 
Q: Under what sorts of circumstance would you have returned the 
stock? 
A: We had no specific agreement. 
Q: Let me ask you again. How do you define the term "security" as 
you used it earlier? 
A: That would have been the option to sell or exchange of 
certificate to obtain funds in payment for unpaid debt. 
TR 45: 
Q: Do you believe that when you got the stock certificate that the 
next day or immediately for that matter that the stock certificate 
could be transferred into your name without further recourse such 
that it became your stock? 
A: Yes. 
TR 46: 
Q: When do you believe, under what set of circumstances, would 
whatever obligation you felt was owed to you arising out of your 
Crane Partnership be satisfied? What amount of compensation, what 
amount of performance would you be satisfied with in connection 
with this transaction? It is unlimited? 
A: At this point in time I would say that it is primarily tied to 
the payment of royalty monies owed to me as a result of Simulator 
Development and the manufacture and sale and ongoing commencement 
for an ongoing proper accounting of funds due and the commitment to 
make future payments. 
TR 49: 
Q: Let me come back to the track I was following a little bit 
earlier. If I were to try to assess what you believe is owed to 
you, arising out of the whole transaction, how would you tell me I 
should quantify what you are owed? 
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A: At this point in time the balance owed to me is represented by 
the royalties on simulator sale, crane simulator sales and those 
royalties outlined in the Manufacturing and Marketing Agreement 
which has been entered into. 
TR 49: 
Q: Do you consider the stock that was represented by Exhibit 6 as 
part of that compensation or is it related more to a concept of the 
royalty that you are concerned about? 
A: The value of the stock would relate to the royalty issue. 
TR 57: 
Q: Did you have any discussion with Loretta Records at the time 
you obtained the certificate identified in Exhibit 6 as to what 
this irrevocable stock or bond power on that exhibit was and how it 
worked? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Can you tell me as best you can recall, what the discussion was 
that took place at that time? 
A: The reason for the stock power was that her merely giving me 
the Digitran certificate was of no value relative to any kind of 
security or collateral in that I had no way of recourse relative to 
selling or disposing of that stock. It was therefore necessary to 
have a stock power in conjunction with the stock for it to be of 
any value to me personally. 
TR 58: 
Q: Was that explained to Loretta Records at the time? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Did you tell her that the execution by her of such a stock 
power would in fact allow you to transfer that stock in your name? 
A: Yes. 
As a result of this conversation relayed by Gary Briggs, 
Plaintiff/Gallent executed Exhibit 6 which is an irrevocable stock 
or bond power. A copy of Exhibit 6 is attached hereto as Addendum 
B. The stock power and stock certificate were delivered on that 
date to the Defendant. 
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On March 17, 1988, Gary Briggs, now a resident of Texas, 
demands payment of interest on the money he advanced to prepay the 
note by reason of the failure of Digitran, Inc. to issue the stock 
agreed upon. (Ex. 7; Depo. p. 51 - 52) Briggs wrote letters to 
Loretta Records Gallent, president of Digitran, demanding 
performance. (Ex. 7) Exhibit 8 is a check by Loretta Records as 
an officer of Simulator Research. She represented herself to be an 
officer of the general partner of Crane Development Ltd. 
Partnership. She paid interest to Briggs on money advanced years 
earlier to prepay the 1990 note. Therefore the Plaintiff, Loretta 
Records in addition to being an individual plaintiff in this case, 
is also the president of Digitran, Inc. or Digicrane and is the 
sole owner of the stock in Simulator Research, Inc., the general 
partner of the limited partnership, a unit of which is owned by 
Gary Briggs. (Ex. 19 p. 10) 
The defaults of Digitran continued. In 1988 Gary Briggs had 
not received the shares of stock to be issued in consideration of 
his prepayment of the note nor had he received royalties from the 
general partner Simulator Research which is wholly owned by Loretta 
Gallent. (See Ex. 7) Exhibit 7 does not contain any offer by 
Briggs to return any personal stock of Loretta Gallent's upon 
delivery by Digitran of the stock to him. In 1988 Digitran 
continued to send Gary Briggs documents for his execution at his 
Texas address. (See Ex. 9 and 10) 
On November 22, 1988, Digitran, Inc. issued to the Defendant 
40,533 shares of stock. (PI. Aff. p. 3, Rec. p. 203) 
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1989 On September 25, 1989, and thereafter the Defendant made 
requests upon Loretta Gallent at Logan, Utah for the payment of 
royalties. (Ex. 28) Briggs was then a resident of the State of 
Texas; Plaintiff is a resident of the State of Utah. The demands 
for royalties continued until the time of the commencement of the 
suit. (See Ex. 13, 15, 23, 27, 29, 30, 31) 
The Plaintiff and her companies moved to Utah approximately 
November of 1988. (See Plaintiff's Affidavit attached to the 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, Rec. p. 2 03) 
Briggs refused to return the 32,160 shares of stock upon the 
delivery to him of the 40,533 shares of stock, upon the basis that 
Digitran, Loretta Gallent and Simulator Research, all of which were 
either owned or controlled by Loretta Gallent, had failed to pay 
royalties as provided in the agreements between the parties. (See 
Ex. 1, 17 p. 6, Ex. 19 p. 70, Ex. 20 p. 6) Many letters passed back 
and forth, however, none resulted in the payment of a royalty nor 
the resolution of the case. 
1992 Briggs was served with Summons in this action on January 
5, 1992 while in Utah attempting to attend the stockholders meeting 
of Digitran in Logan, Utah. 
The Deposition of Gary Briggs was taken December 18, 1992. By 
agreement between the Plaintiff and Defendant, it was published for 
the court's consideration. 
At the time of the Briggs deposition, Plaintiff produced 
Exhibit 33 (see Appendix C) which appears to claim that the receipt 
of this stock is in exchange for the right to receive royalties. 
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The document could not be identified by Gary Briggs nor has the 
document been identified by any other person. 
The deposition also contains Exhibit 34 which is a document 
produced by Loretta R. Gallent which claims to be a copy of an 
original document delivered to Gary Briggs. Neither Exhibits 33 
nor 34 were signed by Briggs nor delivered to him and Briggs claims 
then, as now, that neither can be enforced against him by reason of 
the Statute of Frauds. 
Plaintiff's Complaint in this action is a complaint for 
conversion or the return of personal property or its value. Gary 
Briggs moved the Court for the joinder of third parties and/or 
interpleader on the 22nd day of January, 1993. The motion was 
answered by the Plaintiff, and the Trial Court, in error, denied 
the motion. Loretta Penfold Records, a/k/a Loretta Gallent, 
individually, is the Plaintiff in this action. She is also the 
sole stockholder of Simulator Research, Inc., which is the general 
partner of Crane Development Ltd. Partnership. Gary Briggs is an 
owner of one unit of Crane Development. Loretta is also the 
President and a substantial shareholder of Digitran, Inc. and 
Digicrane. An agreement between Digitran, Inc. and Crane 
Development, the limited partnership, contains an agreement for the 
payment of royalties. (See Ex. 17 and 19) Digitran generated 
sales and has failed to pay royalties. Gary Briggs claims he is 
entitled to royalties under his agreement, and, therefore, Loretta 
Gallent, as the president and general partner of Crane Development 
and Digitran Inc. are necessary parties to this action if a 
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determination of royalties or any offsetting obligations is to be 
made. 
Each party moved the Trial Court for summary disposition; 
Briggs claiming the Plaintiff's action was barred by the Statute of 
Limitations and Gallent claiming her right to the return of the 
stock. The Trial Court denied the Defendant's Motion for Summary 
disposition and granted the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
disposition. Thereafter Defendant made a request for additional 
rulings citing the portions of the record ignored by the Court in 
making its determination. The Court thereafter entered a second 
Memorandum Decision. Plaintiff submitted to the Court and the 
Court signed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order 
granting the Summary Judgment and dismissing the Defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment. (Rec. p. 255) (Addendum D) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
The Trial Court erred in failing to grant Defendant's motion 
for Summary Judgment based upon Utah's borrowing statute cited as 
78-12-45 U.C.A. which provides that a cause of action arising in 
another state, if barred in that state, is barred in the State of 
Utah. Briggs received from Loretta Gallent 32,160 shares of stock 
and an irrevocable stock power on October 8, 1987 in Louisiana. 
Digitran issued the 40,533 shares of stock on November 22, 1988 to 
Gary Briggs in Texas. The action for the return of stock was 
brought by the Plaintiff on January 3, 1992 in Utah. The Texas 
Statute of Limitations of Action is two (2) years for the recovery 
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cancellation of a note. The Court omits the fourth item of 
consideration which was the payment of royalties. Briggs, however, 
asserts that the irrevocable stock or bond power executed by 
Loretta Penfold Records constitutes an unambiguous document the 
execution of which irrevocably transfers all right, title and 
interest in and to 32,190 shares of stock of Digitran Systems, Inc. 
to the Defendant. It is error upon the Trial Court's part to 
consider, as undisputed facts, portions of the deposition of Briggs 
and the affidavit of Loretta Penfold Records which modify or expand 
upon the written documents she executed. 
C. The Trial Court erred in receiving and considering as an 
undisputed fact a document, Exhibit 34, a copy of which is attached 
hereto as Addendum C in violation of the statute of frauds. 
Exhibit 34 purports to be a document executed only by Loretta 
Penfold Records on October 8, 1987, confirming an agreement to 
return 32,190 shares of stock to her upon Gary Briggs receiving 
40,533 shares of stock from Digitran, Inc. and omitting any 
reference to royalties. 
The Trial Court found in its Findings of Fact that the 
Defendant had not returned 32,190 shares of stock and concluded 
that the transaction between Plaintiff and Defendant is reflected 
in a series of documents and there is sufficient question as to why 
the 32,190 shares of stock was transferred to support the admission 
of other evidence and the Trial Court concluded as follows: 
"The transaction between the Plaintiff and the 
Defendant is reflected in a series of 
documents and there is sufficient question as 
to why 32,190 shares of stock were transferred 
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to suppor t the admission of other evidence 
explaining the context and understanding of 
the parties at the time of the transfer. 
Consequently, the court finds as a matter of 
law that Exhibit 6, an irrevocable stock 
power, must be construed together with other 
documents which are in evidence and with the 
Defendant's own testimony and the Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment on the basis :>f 
the statute of frauds must be denied. 
Exhibi t: 3 1 is neither signec ~r endant nor is « 
legitimate existence admitted b\ the Defendant, There is no nexus, 
Trial Court iailec find that •:.}') e ^revocable stock, power 
the admission of testimony or other documents to correct the 
ambiguity. 
I 
The Trial Cou_"t erred :* entering Findings of Fact :~~ 
Summary Judgment, r "oceedino -he "ontents of which are clear 
e v/ i dence of i 1:1a cii spi : • :ts wl i:i c l 1 c J : e r el i ed i lpoi i bj ! tl le • 
Trial COL:1*- * . £ Lance, the Trial Cour% concedes in paragraph 
? of i_h^ u; n.dir.cin *-* r f-y^-pr^  -\j~n ciu^ r*-i ^ '•T * * bp rorohrsd as to why 
ucrei ^  :--.. ,- ->_ __ . ; . :..-i stock. Tl: le 
Court in l-'indiyg : Fa M tonally ignores the issue of 
royalties beina pai-1 as one ^4 * ^ - conditions testified •-< ,-^ -
Briggs. Roys^L-Les .. s one ssues, as tes..nie~ ..: .,^ .^  
Briggs, causir.a vr;- issuance r;^  pergonal stock of Loretta 
• •:ag: *, 
..ijdi Lht: xbsu- •„,•; l o y a l t i e s weic CLaiiuc. ,.-: a o o c i t e d by Gary 
1 5 
Briggs. The Trial Court, however, dismissed the issue with the 
conclusion that there was no other obligation at that time owed to 
Gary Briggs and that the claim of royalties is not before the 
Court. The Court concluded that the Defendant has failed to 
establish that he is entitled to retain the 32,190 shares. The 
fact that the Court and counsel thought it necessary to make 
findings is irrefutable evidence of disputed issues of fact which 
are before the Court, which the Court, in error, has summarily 
dispensed with. 
POINT IV 
Loretta Gallent is the sole shareholder of Simulator Research, 
Inc., the general partner of Crane Development. She is also the 
president of Digitran, Inc. and its allied corporations. She is 
individually the Plaintiff in this case and is a resident of the 
State of Utah. The issue of royalties can be determined in Utah, 
where the parties reside and there the income and profits from the 
business are determined. Louisiana has no contacts with the 
operation of the business at this time. Royalties are an issue and 
therefore in order to have a complete adjudication of the case the 
Trial Court should have included the additional parties and should 
determine if royalties are owed and to whom. 
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ARGUMENT 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FAILING TO GRANT DEFENDANT 
GARY BRIGGS' MOTION TO DISMISS BASED UPON THE APPLICABLE 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS OF THE STATES OF UTAH AND TEXAS? 
r
^ • *
,
'-:.:iew : • facts br iefl} as far as elates and residence an: e 
concerned :he following facts are pertinent: 
1. , --:-:r:'- JL Cdiifori lia, buys a 
Louisiana . imited p^Lcnershi^ U*.^L -.. ^ ^.;siana. 
2. Digitran l:\c and i ~ s predecessors make an agreement 
,u * ."icjne sjinuiatwi. Digitran, luc agrees • , -.• .-JVCI.'. ice-
3. D i g i t r a : . i^aor lates d i r e c t ; w • n the Limited 
D e v e l o p m e n t . . i-jitrdu ..< ouisiaiid ~i:iggs u ,.oiorado. 
4. Or An- ? :-8- Briggs pays $30,J • - prepay note. 
Loretta Records is :i i i Louisiana; Gary Briggs is in Denver, 
Colorado. 
5 . i . .. -. -1 I J o i e 11 a P e n f o 3 d R e c o i d s e x e c i I t e s 
irrevocable stock -rid bond power (Ex. 6) and delivers to Gary 
Briggs 32,190 shares of stock Briggs a resident of Colorado. 
Records a resident r. . . •::. uiia. 
6. Spring of 198 8 Briggs moves to Texas, takes stock with 
h:i i i ;i 19 8 8 Loretta Penfold Records and Digitran, 
Ii IC . .i^ /t: L O Luc- State of Utah. 
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7. November 22, 1988 Digitran, Inc. issues from Utah 40,533 
shares of stock to Gary Briggs in Texas. 
8. January 3, 1992, Loretta Penfold Records Gallent brings 
an action in the State of Utah for the return of stock. 
Gary Briggs is not a resident nor has he ever been a resident 
of the State of Utah. 
Utah's only connection with this action happens to be the fact 
that Loretta Penfold Records Gallent moved to the State of Utah 
along with her company Digitran Inc. Utah Statutes of Limitations 
for recovery of personal property are inapplicable (78-12-
26(2) )****. 
The applicable Statute of Limitation is UCA 78-12-45 which 
states as follows: 
When a cause of action has arisen in another 
state or territory, or in a foreign country, 
and by the laws thereof an action thereon 
cannot there be maintained against a person by 
reason of the lapse of time, an action thereon 
shall not be maintained against him in this 
state, except in favor of one who has been a 
citizen of this state and who has held the 
cause of action from the time it accrued. 
This statute is commonly known as the "borrowing statute". 
The issue then arises as to whether or not the statutes of 
California, Texas, Louisiana or Colorado should be applied in this 
action. 
**** However, if they were, the action is time barred in Utah. 
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The parties' so] e contact with the State of California was 
.. . c L i/ i as a :i : esi dei ice of Ga:i : 5 Br i ggs wl len 1 le pi :II r e l lased 
::he unit oi trie lirrii ted partnership. 
1 -; . ^  j . --1 :j:.L.a 
Gallent delivered 31. ,160 sliares tc him :^  * ne Stat,^ of Louisiana. 
The contacts with the State of Louisiana by the- Dart-;P: : r: il) 
that the limited partnership interest was purchased .xa LJJ . siana 
and (2) that the stock certificate was delivered, to Gary Briggs • 
the State of LOT iis iana . 
The contacts by the parties with the State of Texas are as 
f o l l o w s : 
32. 1°-, shares where deposit, c-a aiu ndve smef- aiai :.: me been held 
that s ta te 
. . . _ a 1 1 
periods _.; - in . nei^ the parties have corresponded relating zo the 
S t O C k p p r f i f i r^»-^c - "'i v"f 1V'-I ,' *" "1 ^ '" " 
• _ _ ; k 
c e r t i n c a t e s have p r : y s i c a i i y Deeri s i t u a t e d , 
,T
^x~<° A~ • h - on! ' -V' -if e :i n wh:i ch the De fendan t and t h e 
'- • 'ai en i i » JI i ! : : l I E:i! p i ii pose :: f :::orai nei icing an 
action for the ret-.; n of the stock. 
The majori" " vuie ±n the united states is that in choico i if 
law cases, except *n contract cases where the parties have agreed 
to a valid choice of law clause, the law of the state with the most 
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significant relationship to the particular substantial issue is 
applied to resolve that issue. Texas has adopted this rule. 
Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Company, 665 SW2d 414 (Texas 1984). 
Louisiana has adopted this rule in the case of Lee v. Ford 
Motor Company, 457 S2d 193 (LA App. 2 Cir. 1984) . 
The Restatement of Laws, Conflict of Laws, Section 145 dealing 
with the conflicts of law in tort cases cites the following 
criteria: 
(a) Place where the injury occurred; 
(b) Place where the conduct causing the injury occurred; 
(c) The domicile residence, nationality, place of 
incorporation, place of business of the parties; and 
(d) The place where the relationship, if any between the 
parties, is centered. 
Section 188 of the restatement of conflicts, contracts, states 
as follows: 
(a) The place of contracting; 
(b) The place of negotiation of the contract; 
(c) The place of performance; 
(d) Location of the subject matter of the contract; and 
(e) The domicile, residence, nationality, place of 
incorporation, place of business of the parties. 
In Plaintiff's Complaint, Plaintiff asks for relief for 
conversion and return of personal property. It also sets forth 
facts which sound in contract. Nonetheless, the substance of the 
Plaintiff's Complaint is a request for the return of personal 
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property,, ^o-w*- s^ock certificates -^ah has adopted the 
i: est:at:ernei : q~. aneiM^ ndi tin, 81 3 I 2< 
(Utah 1991). 
Whethov* """h i s '"'^K^ ~ ° s^v!^d as a o^v* rqp*- "''•"•ti on or a tort*. 
act urn 1.1 . . . . . '.r_ . _ . _. e return ui 
personal property i (2> the reasonable va ue thereof Whether or 
not this matter is d~~ignated as a contract act: tort action 
the criteria is the most significant relationship test. 
donrractually speak: ng, Texas is the stale of performance, j.jcation 
i r • ia^r' ^ i^a - Lg 
• . 1 i. *.-; . -:," . : -L .T . i . e p i a ^ r W i i e r e t h e C O i i d u C l - LI: : U r y C a U S l i i g 
the injur1 ocrurrec the domicile residence of th^ Defendant and 
•jentered rlaintif; submitted aji aifidavi: oy nej nusband stating 
Louisiana had n "• ccntarr^ with •' h^ p a ^ i^ c- *;i 
A for text). 
T1V.. - T p - ^ Q p n o r - | ,* H ^ •£• ! i ni : f ^  t"i ^y] ^  H f~>^  p ^ ">** o ^ i 1 ^  ^  p. "* +" n p >-
_ *_ .IL^J . . .. . .. . . : ptrso:.^. 
property, or taking or detaining the persona, property of another, 
a] ] of rshi~r f--- • •-• th i n the tort action of conversion or the 
zoi itr ac . ..-_... _ tail ler. 
If, as M a m t i f f claims, delivery of the 40, 355 shares of 
stock by "• -"' m e . to Gai~-r Briggs, triggered the reti irn of the 
stock ^rnt-j cause ^f action against: Gary Briggs ii I Texas 
expired on November 23, 1990, two years prior to the commencement 
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of this action. If the cause of action accrued at the time Loretta 
Penfold Records irrevocably executed the stock and bond power, the 
Statute of Limitations ran on October 9, 1989, three years prior to 
commencement of this action. 
According to Plaintiff's affidavit (Rec. 203), paragraph 8, 
Plaintiff Loretta Penfold Records could have and should have and in 
fact asked her secretary to retrieve her stock from Gary Briggs on 
November 22, 1988. She then claims that her secretary did not 
retrieve her shares and failed to inform her of the fact as the 
company was moving to Utah. At this time the sole contact of all 
of the parties was with the Defendant in Texas. The Texas Statute 
of Limitations is the only applicable statute of limitations taking 
into consideration the criteria outlined by the courts and the 
restatement of law. Defendant Gary Briggs is entitled to a 
reversal of the Trial Court dismissing the Plaintiff's claims as a 
matter of law. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING 
PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
A. The Trial Court granted summary judgment under 
circumstances where there are substantial contested issues of fact 
which are acknowledged by the District Court as follows: 
Is the payment of royalties by Digitran, Inc. to Gary 
Briggs, a condition barring the return of the stock 
certificate? Briggs Deposition says yes. (TR 42, 44, 
45, 46, 47, 49, 50, 57, 58, 59; Ex 19, p. 70; Ex. 20, p. 
6; Ex. 13, 14 15, 27, 28, 29, 30 and 31) In contrast see 
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Loretta Gallent's affidavit (Rec. 203) (Ex. 33 and 34). 
The Trial Court in a Memorandum Decision stated as 
follows: 
It is apparent that Defendant feels he has a 
right to receive royalty payments from 
Digicrane or Digitran. Whether he is correct 
in this claim is not an issue before the 
Court. Defendant has received the stock 
promised him in the prepayment agreement. 
Defendant has failed to establish why he is 
entitled to retain the other 32,190 shares. 
Few things in this world are clear. However, it is obvious that 
the Trial Court decided a material contested issue of fact in 
Plaintiff's favor and against Defendant in making the Summary 
Judgment. 
B. The Trial Court erred in receiving evidence in violation 
of the parole evidence rule. 
Exhibit 6 is an unambiguous document in which Loretta Gallent 
unequivocally conveys all of her right, title and interest in 
32,190 shares of stock to Briggs. This document was executed by 
Loretta Penfold Records, aka Loretta Gallent, Plaintiff, without 
any reservation or condition. Loretta Gallent now attempts to 
controvert this document and create conditions upon which the 
document was given. See Affidavit of Loretta Penfold Records. 
(Rec. 203) The question therefore is whether or not the Plaintiff 
can introduce written and oral evidence to modify, interpret or 
vary the terms and conditions of the otherwise unambiguous 
irrevocable stock power. 
In Ron Case Roofing and Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist, 773 
P.2d 1382 (Utah 1989) this Court said: 
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The vesper group's contention about what it 
really intended and its attempt to rely on 
extrinsic evidence in support of its 
contention, ignores the settled rule that in 
interpreting a contract, we first look to the 
four corners of the agreement to determine the 
intentions of the parties. (Citations 
omitted) . The use of extrinsic evidence is 
permitted only if the document appears to 
incompletely express the parties' agreement or 
if it is ambiguous in expressing agreement. 
Exhibit 6 - the irrevocable stock or bond power is neither 
ambiguous nor does it incompletely express the agreement between 
the parties. Gallent must show clear and convincing evidence of 
mistake. West One Trust Co. v. Morrison, 221 Ut Adv. Rep. 12. 
In his deposition, Briggs states that it was his understanding 
that he could use the stock as necessary to fulfill the unpaid 
debts relative to Digitran (TR 44) and that there was no specific 
trigger nor specific agreement to return the stock. (TR 45) The 
affidavit of Loretta R. Gallent says differently, obviously in an 
attempt to boot strap her argument, that the irrevocable stock or 
bond power incompletely expresses the parties' agreement. The 
affidavit of Loretta R. Gallent is inadmissible to create an oral 
condition to the written irrevocable stock and bond power and as 
such, violates the parole evidence rule. Norton v. Blackham, 669 
P.2d 857 (Utah 1983). 
C. Exhibit 34 of the Gary Briggs Deposition is not a binding 
agreement between the parties and is an attempt on the part of 
Loretta R. Gallent to again vary the terms of the written contract. 
Exhibit 34 states as follows: 
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October 8, 1987 
Dear Mr. Gary Briggs: 
This letter is to confirm our conversation 
pertaining to my stock 32,190 shares in 
certificate no. 2939. We are presently in an 
underwriting and as soon as we are finished 
with this project we will complete form D to 
issue you 40,533 shares of restricted stock. 
At that time you will return my personal stock 
to me. 
Sincerely yours, 
Loretta P. Records 
This document is not signed by Gary Briggs and its very 
authenticity was questioned during the deposition at pages 39-43. 
The Plaintiff did not have the original of the document. She had 
no document showing proof that it was sent or delivered, nor any 
evidence that it was authored or written on the date that it 
purports to be. Exhibit 34 cannot be integrated into Exhibit 6 
because it does not meet the requirements of a written agreement. 
Strevell-Paterson Co., Inc. v. Michael R. Francis, 646 P.2d 741 
(Utah 1982) where this court said: 
It is well settled that an original agreement 
is within the statute of frauds. Any 
subsequent agreement which alters or amends it 
must also satisfy the requirement of the 
statute. Zion's Properties, Inc. v. Holt, 538 
P.2d 1319 (Utah 1975); Combined Metals, Inc. 
v. Bastian, 71 Ut 535 267 P.2d 1020 (1928) . 
This Court addressed the exact issue in Sparrow v. Tayco 
Construction Co. , 846 P. 2d 1323 (Ut App. 1993) where this court 
refused to integrate three of five documents because they lacked 
mutual assent. Therefore, Exhibit 6, the Irrevocable Stock or Bond 
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Power, satisfies the requirement of the Statute of Frauds in that 
Briggs is attempting to enforce the document against Gallent, but 
Exhibit 34 does not satisfy the requirements of the Statute of 
Frauds in that Exhibit 34 is not signed by Briggs. There is no 
nexus between the two documents nor is there any act which appears 
in the record that is done in reliance or part performance of 
Exhibit 34. In Machan v. Hampshire Properties, Inc. v. Western 
Real Estate & Development Company, 779 P. 2d 230 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989) : 
One or more writings, not all of which are to 
be signed by the party to be charged may be 
considered together as a memorandum for 
purposes of the statute of frauds if there is 
a nexus between them.... the nexus 
requirement is satisfied either by express 
reference in the signed writing or to the 
unsigned one, or by implied reference gleaned 
from the contents of the writings and the 
circumstances surrounding the transaction. 
Exhibit 34, therefore, cannot be integrated because it is an 
offer or proposal. It does not meet the requirements of a written 
agreement as it is unsigned by the person to be charged with the 
agreement and it lacks mutual assent. (See 25-5-4 UCA 1953; §70A-
2-301(1); §70A-8-319; §70A-8-308; §70A-8-313 contained in Addendum 
A) 
The deposition of Gary Briggs and for that matter the 
affidavit of Loretta R. Gallent reveals the difference between 
admissible evidence and discoverable evidence. Gary Briggs 
testified relative to the transfer of the stock and the 
conversations prior to the transfer of the stock. That may be 
discoverable evidence but it is not necessarily admissible 
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evidence. The Trial Court's granting of a Motion for Summary 
Judgment must be based upon competent admissible evidence not in 
violation of the parole evidence rule, the statute of fraud and for 
that matter not creating contested issues of fact. Norton v. 
Blackham, supra and Rainford v. Rytting. 22 Ut.2d 252 451 P.2d 769 
(1969) where this Court struck an affidavit consisting entirely of 
inadmissible parole evidence submitted for the purpose of varying 
and adding to the terms of a written agreement of the parties. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANT SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS 
EVIDENCED BY THE TRIAL COURTS ENTRIES OF FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, THE CONTENTS OF WHICH 
EVIDENCE MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT ASSUMING THAT PLAINTIFF 
HAS PROVED HER RIGHT TO INTRODUCE PAROL EVIDENCE, 
The single and most pervasive fact issue created by the 
Judge's Memorandum Decision and the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law is whether or not the delivery of 32,190 shares 
of stock in Digitran, Inc. by Loretta R. Gallent to Gary Briggs was 
for or in consideration of the payment of royalties. The fact that 
the Court and counsel for Gallent saw fit to enter Findings of Fact 
rather than a recitation of undisputed facts gives rise to the 
recognition that there is an undecided material fact before this 
Court. The Trial Court's Memorandum Decision recognizes this fact 
at pages 3 and 4. (See Rec. 243, Addendum 1) Findings of Fact 
signed by the Court recognize the issue at paragraph 6 of the Facts 
and paragraph 4 of the Conclusion of Law. (Addendum E) See Shayne 
v. Stanley & Sons, Inc., 605 P.2d 775 (Utah 1980) which requires 
counsel for both parties to stipulate to the facts. Webster v. 
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Sill, 675 P. 2d 1170 (Utah 1983) which states that upon a Motion for 
Summary Judgment it is not for the Court to weigh evidence or 
assess credibility. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING 
TO JOIN NECESSARY THIRD PARTIES. 
Loretta Gallent is the sole shareholder of Simulator Research, 
a Louisiana corporation which is the general partner of Crane 
Development, a Louisiana Limited Partnership. Loretta Gallent is 
also the president of Digitran, Inc., which has an operating 
agreement with Crane Development to pay royalties. (See Ex. 17 and 
19) Inasmuch as the sole owner of Simulator, which is the only 
general partner, and the president of the royalty paying 
corporation are one and the same person, there is a substantial 
conflict of interest. Defendant has the right under §48A-2A-1001 
ect. to maintain this action. Digitran, Inc. and its subsidiary 
Simulator Research, Inc., the general partner of Crane Development, 
are necessary parties. To leave them out of the loop would allow 
the Plaintiff, as an individual, to assert a plethora of defenses 
against the general partner of the limited partnership and Digitran 
without their presence in court. 
The deposition of Gary Briggs corroborates the fact that the 
transfer of stock by Loretta Records, an individual, to Gary Briggs 
was in part consideration for the corporation's failure to meet its 
obligation to the limited partnership for the payment of royalties. 
Also for the failure of the general partner to in turn secure 
royalties from the corporation. 
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The inclusion of the necessary parties is a matter of 
procedure. Procedural law dictates the rights of the parties to 
appear before the Court. Utah Procedure is applicable in this 
case. Buhler v. Maddison, 166 P.2d 205 (Utah 1946) . 
In Plaintiff's answer to Briggs' Motion to join third parties 
the Plaintiff attached to the answer an affidavit together with 
exhibits from the Plaintiff. (See Rec. 118) The attachments show 
a clear intention on the part of the Plaintiff acting as the sole 
owner of Simulator Research, the general partner, to release 
obligations of a debt and her conduct as the president of Simulator 
Research is in direct derogations of the rights of the limited 
partners which further illustrate the err of the Trial Court in 
failing to join the indispensable parties to this action. 
CONCLUSION 
As a matter of law Gary R. Briggs, Defendant/Appellant is 
entitled to a summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint by 
reason of the failure of Plaintiff to institute this action within 
the appropriate limitations of action. Alternatively, the 
Defendant Gary M. Briggs is entitled to a Motion for Summary 
Judgment based upon the Plaintiff's execution of an irrevocable 
stock or bond power the terms of which cannot be varied by parole 
evidence and have not been varied by reason of other documents 
unsigned by Gary M. Briggs. The Order of the Trial Court should be 
reversed and Plaintiff's Complaint dismissed. 
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25-5-4 FRAUD 
pi icable where the alleged acts of part perfor-
mance were not referable to the alleged oral 
contract to sell land. McDonald v. Barton Bros. 
Inv. Corp., 631 P.2d 851 (Utah 1981). 
The doctrine of partial performance was not 
applicable where all of the acts alleged were 
not exclusively referable to the alleged oral 
modification of a construction and lease agree-
ment. Downtown Athletic Club v. Horman, 740 
P.2d 275 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
—Evidence. 
Purchaser of land under an oral contract 
seeking to avoid the statute of frauds under the 
doctrine of part performance, based upon his 
possession of the land and improvements 
thereon, must establish that possession was ac-
tual, open, exclusive and with the seller's con-
sent; improvements made were substantial, 
valuable and beneficial; a valuable consider-
ation was given in exchange for the convey-
ance; and all of the foregoing was exclusively 
referable to the contract. Coleman v. Dillman, 
624 P.2d 713 (Utah 1981). 
To meet the part performance exception to 
the statute of frauds, the terms of the oral con-
tract must be established by clear and definite 
evidence. Bradshaw v. McBride, 649 P.2d 74 
(Utah 1982). 
Promissory estoppel. 
The elements of promissory estoppel neces-
sary to preclude the operation of this section 
were not present in a case where a lessee and a 
man claiming to be the lessor entered into an 
oral agreement for the lease of property and 
the lease was to be reduced to writing by the 
lessor but was never written because the lessor 
learned of a defect in the chain of title. The 
lessee moved on the property and then brought 
action against the claimed lessor. The lessee 
did not expend any moneys upon the leased 
premises, but was damaged because of the loss 
of a good bargain. Easton v. Wycoff, 4 Utah 2d 
386, 295 P.2d 332 (1956). 
Recovery upon quantum meruit or theory 
of unjust enrichment. 
Where defendant owner entered into oral 
agreement to sell described land to plaintiff at 
specified price, which was void under this sec-
tion, and plaintiff thereafter entered into con-
tract to sell same land to third person at profit, 
but, when defendant learned of latter contract, 
he refused to sell to plaintiff and sold land to 
third person for same amount that latter had 
agreed to pay plaintiff, plaintiff was not enti-
tled to recover on theory of unjust enrichment 
for value of his services in procuring pur-
chaser, even in absence of § 25-5-4(5). Baugh 
v. Darley, 112 Utah 1, 184 P.2d 335 (1947). 
Sale defined. 
As applied to land, the word "sale" implies 
the creation of an estate in excess of a lease-
hold, by the act of the owner. Lewis v. Dahl, 
108 Utah 486, 161 P.2d 362, 160 A.L.R. 1040 
(1945). 
Settling of accounts. 
Defense that agreement by wife to convey 
ranch to former husband and herself jointly 
was not in writing and thereby void was not 
invocable in equity proceedings of settling ac-
counts between the parties where ranch had 
been sold and court was concerned only with 
distribution of proceeds. Corbet v. Corbet, 24 
Utah 2d 378, 472 P.2d 430 (1970). 
Subscription. 
A document to be enforceable under the stat-
ute of frauds must be subscribed by the party 
granting the conveyance. Williams v. Single-
ton, 723 P.2d 421 (Utah 1986). 
Surrender, release or discharge. 
Surrender of interest under contract for pur-
chase of land could be properly effected without 
a deed or conveyance in writing in compliance 
with this statute. Budge v. Barron, 51 Utah 
234, 169 P. 745 (1917). 
Termination or rescission of contract 
An agreement to terminate or rescind a con-
tract must be in writing, if the contract that is 
extinguished falls within the statute of frauds. 
SCM Land Co. v. Watkins & Faber, 732 P.2d 
105 (Utah 1986). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 72 Am. Jur. 2d Statute of 
Frauds § 59 et 6eq 
Key Numbers. — Frauds, Statute of < 
et seq 
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25-5-4. Certain agreements void unless written and sub-
scribed. 
In the following cases every agreemen^shal) be void unless such agreement, 
or so:ne note or memorandum thereof, is injwriting subscribed by the party to 
be charged therewith: / 
12 
STATUTE OF FRAUDS 25-5-4 
lis terms is not to be performed within one 
for the debt, default or miscarriage of 
(1) Ever} agreement that 1 
year from the making the* 
(2) Every promise to answer 
another. 
(3) Every agreement, promisor undertaking made upon consideration 
of marriage, except mutual promises to marry. 
(4) Every special promise made by an executor or administrator to 
answer in damages for the liabilities, or to pay the debts, of the testator or 
intestate out of his own estate. / 
(5) Every agreer nt authorizing or employing an agent or broker to 
purchase or sell rtdl estate (oj compensation 
History. R.8.1898 & CX. 1907,1 2467; L. 
1909, ch 72, t l;C.L.1917t$ 5817; R.S. 1933 
* C. 1943, S3-M. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Accord and satisfaction 
Affirmative defense 
Alteration or modification of original contract 
Assignments 
Brokerage contracts 
—Action by broker 
^-Finder's agreement 
—Full} executed contracts 
—Procuring lessee 
—Procuring option 
—Subscription 
City council minutes 
Contract not to be performed within a year 
—Automobile rental 
Contract to make will 
Evidence 
—Proving nature of agreement 
Part performance 
Promise to recover for another's debt or de 
fault 
—Promisor's own purposee served 
Recovery upon quantum meruit 
Revocation or release of agreement to answer 
for debt of another 
Stipulation 
Unilateral contract* 
Accord and satisfaction 
Although it IF well settled in Utah that if an 
©ngmal agreement u within the statute of 
frauds, a subsequent modifying agreement 
muFt also aatiRf) the statute of frauds, an sc 
cord and satisfaction IB something entirel} dif 
ferent and need not be in writing e\er if the 
onpnal contract wa< mithm the statute of 
frajd Goldtr Ke\ Realt},lnc v Wantas,699 
P.2d 730 (Utah 1*985 
Afnrm8tj\e defense 
^ iifcn an action if on a contract, admitted b} 
defendant, he must interpose a Special plea of 
this statute if statute is to be available as a 
defense. Abba v. Smyth, 21 Utah 109,59 P. 756 
(1899) 
Statute of frauds must be pleaded by party 
relying upon it as a defense M & S Constr & 
Eng'g Co v. Clearfield State Bank, 19 Utah 2d 
86, 426 P.2d 227 (1967) 
Defendant, who answered by a general de-
nial and simultaneous motion to dismiss plain-
tiff's claim as being barred under Subsection 
(2) of this section, proceeded improperly, since 
under Rule 12(b), Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, statute of frauds is not a ground for mo-
tion to dismiss but rather an affirmative de-
fense under Rule 8(c) W W. & W3 Gardner, 
Inc v. Pappas, 24 Utah 2d 264, 470 P.2d 252 
(1970). 
Alteration or modification of original con-
tract 
If original contract, to be binding and en-
forceable, and to aatisf) the statute of frauds, is 
required to be in writing and subscribed b\ 
parties sought to be charged, then s subse 
quent agreement altering or modifying an} of 
IU ma ten a 1 parts or term* is also required to 
be in writing and so subscribed no part perfor-
mance or anything done b} such part} in reli 
ance on the subsequent agreement being al-
leged or proved, especiall} if interest in land IP 
involved Combined MetaU luc v BasUan,?l 
Utah 535, 267 P 1020 (192^ 
Panie- ma} modif} oralh ar agreement in 
writing *here the original contract is not re 
quired by the statute of fraud- to be in writing 
at leact nhere there is consideration for such 
modification But s contract required b} the 
statute of frauds to be lr writing cannot be 
modified bv a subsequent a! agreement, si 
though thi<. rule IB subject u mar\ cxceptioiiS 
the first great diMsion coming between execu 
13 
INVESTMENT SECURITIES 70A-8-204 
70A-8-203. Staleness as notice of defects or defenses. 
(1) After an act or event creating a right to immediate performance of the 
principal obligation represented by a certificated security or that sets a date 
on or after which the security is to be presented or surrendered for redemption 
or exchange, a purchaser is charged with notice of any defect in its issue or 
defense of the issuer if: 
(a) the act or event is one requiring the payment of money, the delivery 
of certificated securities, the registration of transfer of uncertificated se-
curities, or any of these on presentation or surrender of the certificated 
security, the funds or securities are available on the date set for payment 
or exchange, and he takes the security more than one year after that date; 
and 
(b) the act %r event is not covered by Subsection (a) and he takes the 
security more than two years after the date set for surrender or presenta-
tion or the date on which performance became due. 
(2) A call that has been revoked is not within Subsection (1). 
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 8-203; 1989, ch. tuted ''represented" for "evidenced" in the in-
218, $ 12. troductory language of Subsection (1), Bubsti-' 
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend- tuted "the registration of transfer of uncertifi-
ment, effective April 24,1989, inserted "certifi- cated securities, or any of these" for "or both" 
cated" in the preliminary language of Subsec- in Subsection (l)(a), and made stylistic 
tion (1) and twice in Subsection (l)(a), substi- changes throughout. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Ju r . 2d. — 15A Am. Jur. 2d Commer- Municipal Corporations § 1965; 81A CJJ.S. 
cial Code § 81. States § 258. 
C.J.S. — 11 CJ.S. Bonds § 81 et seq.; 18 Key Numbers. — Bonds «= 96; Corporations 
CJ.S. Corporations §§ 253 et seq., 444; 19 «= 108, 149, 466 et seq.; Municipal Corpora-
CJ.S. Corporations § 1227 et seq.; 64 CJ.S. tions *= 940 et seq.; States •= 163. 
70A-8-204. Effect of issuer's restrictions on transfer. 
A restriction on transfer of a security imposed by the issuer, even though 
otherwise lawful, is ineffective against any person without actual knowledge 
of it unless: 
(1) the security is certificated and the restriction is noted conspicuously 
on the instrument; or 
(2) the security is uncertificated and a notation of the restriction is 
contained in the initial transaction statement sent to the person or, if his 
interest is transferred to him other than by registration of transfer, 
pledge, or release, in the initial transaction statement sent to the regis-
tered owner or the registered pledgee. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 8-204; 1989, ch. 6picuoush on the BecunU a restriction on 
218, | 13. tran?rer imposed b\ the issuer e\en though 
Amendment Notes. — The 19£9 amend- otherwise lawful is inefTecti\e except against a 
ment, effecti\e April 24,1989, rewrote this sec- person *ith actual knowledge of it " 
tion, which formerh read *Tmles< noted con-
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70A-8-208. Effect of signature of authenticating trustee, 
registrar or transfer agent 
(1) A person placing his signature upon a certificated security or an initial 
transaction statement as authenticating trustee, registrar, transfer agent, or 
the like, warrants to a purchaser for value of the certificated security or a 
purchaser for value of an uncertificated security to whom the initial transac-
tion statement has been sent, if the purchaser is without notice of the particu-
lar defect, that: 
(a^  the certificated security or initial transaction statement is genuine; 
(b) his own participation in the issue or registration of the transfer, 
pledge, or release of the security is within his capacity and within the 
scope of the authority received by him from the issuer; and 
(c) he has reasonable grounds to believe that the security is in the form 
and within the amount the issuer is authorized to issue. 
(2) Unless otherwise agreed, a person by so placing his signature does not 
assume responsibility for the validity of the security in other respects. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, € 8-208; 1989, ch. ment, effective April 24,1989, so rewrote Sub-
218, § 17. section (1) as to make a detailed analysis im-
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend- practicable. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 15A Am. Jur. 2d Commer- Key Numbers. — Corporations *=» 108,149, 
cial Code § 88. 466 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 18 CJ.S Corporations §§ 253 et 
seq., 444; 19 C J.S. Corporations § 1162 et seq 
PART 3 
PURCHASE 
70A-8-301. Rights acquired by purchaser. 
(1) Upon transfer of a security to a purchaser under Section 70A-8-313, the 
purchaser acquires the rights in the security which his transferor had, or had 
actual authority to convey unless the purchaser's rights are limited by Sub-
section 70A-8-302(4). 
(2) A transferee of a limited interest acquires rights only to the extent of 
the interest transferred. The creation or release of a security interest in a 
security is the transfer of a limited interest in that security. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 154,1 S-301; 1989, ch. 
216, § 18. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend-
ment, effective April 24, 1969, substituted 
"transfer of a secunt) to 8 purchaser under 
Section 70A-8-313' for "deliver} of a secunt}" 
in Subsection (1), substituted Sinless the pur-
chaser's nghu art limited b\ Subsection 
70A-8-302.4>' for "except that a purchaser who 
has himself beer a part\ to an) fraud or ille 
galit) affecting the security or who as prior 
holder had notice of an adverse claim cannot 
improve his position by taking from a later 
bona fide purchaser'1 in Subsection (1), deleted 
the former second Bentence of Subsection (1), 
construing *ad\erse claim**, deleted former 
Subsection (2», which read "A bona fidt pur-
chaser in addition to acquiring the rights of a 
purchaser also acquires the security free of am 
adverse claim " redesignated former Subsec-
tion (3> ac (2), substituted •transferee'" for 
"purchaser" and 'transferred* for "purchased* 
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70A-8-307. Effect of delivery without indorsement — Right 
to compel indorsement. 
If a certificated security in registered form has been delivered to a pur-
chaser without a necessary indorsement he may become a bona fide purchaser 
only as of the time the indorsement is supplied, but against the transferor the 
transfer is complete upon delivery and the purchaser has a specifically en-
forceable right to have any necessary indorsement supplied. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 8-307; 1989, ch. Cross-References. — Documents of title, 
218, § 24. delivery without indorsement, right to compel 
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend- indorsement, § 70A-7-506. 
ment, effective April 24,1989, substituted wIf a 
certificated security" for "Where a security." 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Failure to indorse certificate. withheld for security reasons, the failure to in-
A seller of stock should be at liberty to pro- dorse does not evidence an intention not to 
tect his certificate from passing into tae hands complete the sale. Taylor v. Daynes, 118 Utah 
of innocent third parties until such time as 61,218 P.2d 1069 (1950) (decided under former 
payment is tendered and if the certificate is Uniform Stock Transfer Act), 
delivered unconditionally but indorsement is 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 15A Am. Jur. 2d Commer- Key Numbers. — Corporations «=» 108,125, 
cial Code § 101. 149, 466 et seq. 
CJ.S. — 18 C.J.S. Corporations §§ 253 et 
seq., 444; 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 1162 et seq. 
70A-8-308. Indorsements — Instructions — "Appropriate 
person," 
(1) An indorsement of a certificated security in registered form is made 
when an appropriate person signs on it, or on a separate document, an assign-
- ment or transfer of the security or a power to assign or transfer it, or when the 
signature of such person is written without more upon the back of the secu-
rity. 
(2) An indorsement may be in blank or special. An indorsement in blank 
includes an indorsement to bearer. A special indorsement specifies to whom 
the security is to be transferred, or who has power to transfer it. A holder may 
convert a blank indorsement into a special indorsement. 
(3) An indorsement purporting to be only of part of a certificated security 
representing units intended by the issuer to be separately transferable is 
effective to the extent of the indorsement. 
(4) (a) An "instruction" is an order to the issuer of an uncertificated secu-
rity requesting that the transfer, pledge, or release from pledge of the 
uncertificated security specified in the instruction be registered. 
(b) An instruction originated by an appropriate person is: 
(i) a writing signed by an appropriate person; or 
(ii) a communication to the issuer in any form agreed upon in 
writing, signed by the issuer and an appropriate person. 
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70A-8-313 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
(5) Any person guaranteeing an indorsement of a certificated security 
makes not only the warranties of a signature guarantor under Subsection (1) 
but also warrants the rightfulness of the particular transfer in all respects. 
(6) Any person guaranteeing an instruction requesting the transfer, pledge, 
or release of an uncertificated security makes not only the warranties of a 
special signature guarantor under Subsection (3) but also warrants the right-
fulness of the particular transfer, pledge, or release in all respects. 
(7) An issuer may not require a special guarantee of signature under Sub-
section (3), a guarantee of indorsement under Subsection (5), or a guarantee of 
instruction under Subsection (6), as a condition to registration of transfer, 
pledge, or release. 
(8) The foregoing warranties are made to any person taking or dealing with 
the security in reliance on the guarantee, and the guarantor is liable to the 
person for any loss resulting from breach of the warranties. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, S 8-312; 1989, ch. and made related and punctuation changes; in 
218, { 29. Subsection (5), substituted "guaranteeing" for 
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend- *may guarantee," "makes" for "and by so doing 
ment, effective April 24, 1989, added Subsec- warrants," and "guarantor under Subsection 
tions (2), (3), (4), (6), and (7), renumbering the (1)" for "(Subsection 1)," inserted "certificated" 
existing subsections accordingly; in Subsection "warranties of a," and "warrants," and deleted 
(1), inserted "certificated" in the introductory the final sentence, which read "But no issuer 
language, inserted "under" in Subsection may require a guarantee of indorsement as a 
(1Kb), deleted the final sentence, which read condition to registration of transfer"; and, in 
"But the guarantor does not otherwise warrant Subsection (8), inserted a comma and substi-
the rightfulness of the particular transfer," tuted "the person" for "such person." 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. JUT. 2d. — 15A Am. Jur. 2d Commer- C.J.S. — 38 C J.S. Guaranty § 44 et teq. 
cial Code § 103. Key Numbers. — Guaranty «= 27 et seq. 
70A-8-313. When transfer to purchaser occurs — Finan-
cial intermediary as bona fide purchaser — "Fi-
nancial intermediary." 
(1) Transfer of a security or a limited interest therein, including a security 
interest, to a purchaser occurs only: 
(a) at the time he or a person designated by him acquires possession of 
a certificated security; 
(b) at the time the transfer, pledge, or release of an uncertificated secu-
rity is registered to him or a person designated by him; 
(c) at the time his financial intermediary acquires possession of a cer-
tificated security specially indorsed to or issued in the name of the pur-
chaser; 
(d) at the time his financial intermediary, not a clearing corporation, 
sends him confirmation of the purchase and also by book entry' <>r other-
wise identifies as belonging to the purchaser: 
(i) a specific certificated security in the financial intermediary's 
possession; 
(ii) a quantity of securities that constitute or are part of a fungible 
bulk of certificated securities in the financial intermediary's posses-
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sion or of uncertificated securities registered in the name of the fi-
nancial intermediary; or 
(iii) a quantity of securities that constitute or are part of a fungible 
bulk of securities shown on the account of the financial intermediary 
on the books of another financial intermediary; 
(e) with respect to an identified certificated security to be delivered 
while still in the possession of a third person, not a financial intermedi-
ary, at the time that person acknowledges that he holds for the purchaser; 
(f) with respect to a specific uncertificated security the pledge or trans-
fer of which has been registered to a third person, not a financial interme-
diary, at the time that person acknowledges that he holds for the pur-
chaser; 
(g) at the time appropriate entries to the account of the purchaser, or a 
person designated by him, on the books of a clearing corporation are made 
under Section 70A-8-320; 
(h) with respect to the transfer of a security interest where the debtor 
has signed a security agreement containing a description of the security, 
at the time a written notification, which, in the case of the creation of the 
security interest, is signed by the debtor which may be a copy of the 
security agreement or wThich, in the case of the release or assignment of 
the security interest created pursuant to this subsection, is signed by the 
secured party, is received by: 
(i) a financial intermediary on whose books the interest of the 
transferor in the security appears; 
(ii) a third person, not a financial intermediary, in possession of 
the security, if it is certificated; 
(iii) a third person, not a financial intermediary, who is the regis-
tered owner of the security, if it is uncertificated and not subject to a 
registered pledge; or 
(iv) a third person, not a financial intermediary, who is the regis-
tered pledgee of the security, if it is uncertificated and subject to a 
registered pledge; 
(i) writh respect to the transfer of a security interest wThere the trans-
feror has signed a security agreement containing a description of the 
security, at the time new value is given by the secured party; or 
(j) writh respect to the transfer of a security interest wrhere the secured 
party is a financial intermediary and the security has already been trans-
ferred to the financial intermediary under Subsection (a), (b), (c), (d), or 
(g), at the time the transferor has signed a security agreement containing 
a description of the security and value is given by the secured party. 
(2) The purchaser is the owner of a security held for him by a financial 
itermediary, but cannot be a bona fide purchaser of a security so held except 
i the circumstances specified in Subsections (l)(c), (d)(i), and (g). If a security 
) held impart of a fungible bulk as in the circumstances specified in Subsec-
ons (l)(d)(ii) and (D(dKiii), the purchaser is the owner of a proportionate 
roperty interest in the fungible bulk. 
(3) Notice of an adverse claim received by the financial intermediary or by 
le purchaser after the financial intermediary takes delivery of a certificated 
3curity as a holder for value or after the transfer, pledge, or release of an 
ncertificated security has been registered free of the claim to a financial 
itermediary who has given value is not effective either as to the financial 
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LIMITATION OF ACTIONS 78-12-45 
agreement was made; (2) by the debtor/obligor 
of the settlement agreement (or by a third 
party at the debtor's direction); and (3) the pay-
ment was made to the creditor under the set-
tlement agreement. Butcher v. Gilroy, 744 
P.2d 311 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Verbal agreement. 
A verbal agreement or new promise based 
upon a prior agreement barred by statute 
comes within this section. Whitehill v. Lowe, 
10 Utah 419, 37 P. 589 (1894) (decided under 
prior law). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation 
of Actions § 325 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions 
§ 261. 
A.L.R. — Promises to settle or perform as 
estopping reliance on statute of limitations, 44 
A.L.R.3d 482. 
Promises or attempts by seller to repair 
goods as tolling statute of limitations for 
breach of warranty, 68 A.L.R.3d 1277. 
Key Numbers. — Limitations of Actions «= 
146. 
78-12-45. Action barred in another state barred here. 
When a cause of action has arisen in another state or territory, or in a 
foreign country, and by the laws thereof an action thereon cannot there be 
maintained against a person by reason of the lapse of time, an action thereon 
shall not be maintained against him in this state, except in favor of one who 
has been a citizen of this state and who has held the cause of action from the 
time it accrued. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 68, § 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-12-45. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Applicability of section. 
—Counterclaim. 
Act occurring in other state. 
Choice of laws. 
—Utah court. 
Exception to section. 
—Assignee of resident's claim. 
—State resident. 
Accrual of cause of action. 
Applicability of section. 
This section is a general provision applying 
to causes of action that arise in a different 
state and are not reduced to judgment. Pan En-
ergy v. Martin, 813 P.2d 1142 (Utah 1991). 
—Counterclaim. 
Act occurring in other state. 
Where defendant's counterclaim for mal-
practice occurring in Idaho was barred by the 
Idaho statute of limitation, it would be barred 
here under this section. Lindsav v. Woodward, 
5 Utah 2d 183, 299 P.2d 619(1956). 
Choice of laws. 
—Utah court. 
In wrongful death action by Utah resident 
against Colorado residents, in which Utah 
court had quasi in rem jurisdiction, Utah court 
applied Utah law on matter concerning the 
statute of limitations, including the tolling 
thereof. Rhoades v. Wright, 622 P.2d 343 (Utah 
1980), cert, denied, 454 U.S. 897, 102 S. Ct. 
397, 70 L. Ed. 2d 212 (1981). 
Exception to section. 
—Assignee of resident's claim. 
Resident of Utah, who acquired claim upon 
which he based his right of action by virtue of 
assignment after cause of action had accrued 
thereon, did not come within exception to this 
section. Lawson v. Tripp, 34 Utah 28,95 P. 520 
(1908). 
—State resident. 
Accrual of cause of action. 
Only those persons who are Utah residents 
as of the date their cause of action arises come 
within the exception to this section Allen v. 
Greyhound Lines, 583 P.2d 613 (Utah 1978). 
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EXEMPTIONS continued 
to extent that contributions thereto were tax exempt, plus interest or dividends) are 
exempt from all liabiht) from debt except for ahmon) and child support But no 
contribution to such fund is exempt if made within one year of filing for bankruptcy or 
within one year of filing of wnt of seizure Mgamst such plan (T 20, §3311), •* *rn'd 
Act 362 of 1983) All gratuitous pa>ments made b> employers to employees or former 
employees or their widows heirs or beneficiaries are also exempt from all but alimo-
ny and child support obligations (T 20, §33[2]) 
Homestead Exemption —See topic Homesteads 
FACTORS 
Ar> factor, broker, commission merchant, middleman or other person or corpora 
tion acting as commission merchant, or undertaking to sell for another any goods, 
wares, merchandise sugar, cotton nee, or any other agricultural produce, must ren-
der a true and correct account of the sales thereof within fifteen days of the date of 
said sales, which statement must give the name and address of the person or corpora 
tion to whom sold and dates of said sales (T 51 §5) Cotton merchants purchasing 
from farmers must register with Commissioner of Agriculture and provide bond of 
$50 000 (T 3, §700 et seq , as am'd Act 888 of 1985) 
Bond —Commission merchants who sell in this state on commission or bu> as 
agent or broker an> farm products fish oysters shrimp crabs game or fur skins must 
furnish bond to Commissioner of Agriculture, etc , in the sum of $1000 (T 51, §§1-
4) 
False Statements, Etc —It is misdemeanor to render a false statement or account of 
a sale of cotton or other agricultural product or falsel) to represent that such prod 
nets are held for future sale when sold, or when the) are held on consignment, to sell, 
without rendering a complete account, showing price, grade, and name and address of 
purchaser, or with intent to defraud consignor, to make a false charge, report of 
condition, or statement (T 3, §500) 
lien.—Factor has ben on movables entrusted to him for sale and on proceeds and 
unpaid purchase money, which is pnor to ben of attachment If facur becomes insol-
vent, consignor may reclaim goods consigned or if sold has ben on unpaid price 
thereof (C C 3247-8) 
Recordation of Contracts —There are no provisions as to filing or recording con-
signment agreements or notices of factors' bens 
Business license tax levied on all factorage, brokerage or commission businesses 
ranges from a minimum of S30 when the gross annual commissions are less than 
$5,000 to a maximum of $4,000 when such commissions are $500,000 or more, twen-
ty-two classes bang provided for (T 47, c 3) 
FILING FEES 
See topics Chattel Mortgages, Corporations, Records 
FORECLOSURE 
See topics Liens, Mortgages of Real Property 
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS 
See topics Corporations, Insurance 
FRANCHISES: 
No special legislation Uniform Franchise and Business Opportunities Act not 
adopted 
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF 
See also topic Commercial Code 
No statute as such Analogous provision* are 
Transfer of immovable property must be in writing but if a verbal sale or other 
disposition of such propert) be made it is good against the vendor and vendee who 
confesses it when interrogated on oath provided actual delivery has been made of the 
immovable (C C 2275) 
Sale of movables verbal!) is valid but all verba1 agreements relative to movable 
propert) and al' verbal contracts for pavment of mone> mhere value is in execs* of 
S \ T ma> be proved b> two or more witnesses or one witness and other corroborative 
circumstances (C C 2277, 2441) Verba1 sale of movables mithout delivery cannot 
a TIEhts of third persons (C C 224") 
Parol evidence i^  no' received to prove an\ promise to pa\ (1) A judgmen* of am 
coun in oi ou* of thi* state for the purpose of taking same out of prescription or 
irvn ing it after prescription has rur (2) an) debt or liability of one deceased in order 
to take it out of prescription or to revive it after prescription ha* run (3) the deb of 
a third perso (4) an\ debt or haMlitv evidenced b> anting when prescription ha<> 
alreadv rur 1 u' in all these case*, the acknowledgment or promise^ mu^ be in anting 
signed b) tht pan> to be bound or bs hiv agcrt or attornc) m fact speciall) autho-
rized in wnting so to do (C C 227*) 
FRAUDULENT S\LES AND C O W E i ANCES 
Annulment —Obligee has right to annual act of obligor or result or failure to act of 
oblige mad* or e ^ t e d after ngV of o^'igee arov tha causes or ircrease* oblige s 
m^Uenr) (C C 20H ef Ja- 1 19e<; Obligor deemed invoHc-' mher total of 
liabilities exceed^ tou' of fair Is appra sed assets (CC 20V, ef Jar 1 198<) Ob 
g c mas annul onerous contract und* cenair conditions (C C 20^8 eff Ja^ 1, 
19fc*) Oblige* ma\ attack gratuitous cor »-act mad* b) obligor whe'he or not other 
par, io cortra t knew tha contract mould cause or increase obliges insolvent 
(C C 20^9 ef Jar 1 19^) Actior of obligee must be brought wuhir one year fror 
time he learned or should have learned of act o failure to ac< bu' not more thar three 
yea-v from act (C C 2041 cf Jar 1, 198<) Oohgee mav no annul contract of 
ob'igor in regJa' course of business (C C 204C ef Jan 1, 198<) Obligee must )oir 
obligor and third persons who can plead discussion of obligor's assets (C C 2 0 o r f 
Jan 1, 1985) If obligor-establishes right to annul such right is exercised onh^ 
extent that it affects obligees rights (CC 2043, eff Jan 1, 1985) Obugt*^ 
exercise obligor's right when he refuses to do so, unless it is strictly personal, if
 < j ^ 
causes or increases insolvency by hi* refusal (C C 2044, eff Jan 1, 1985) ^ * * 
Bulk Sales —Transfer m bulk and not in ordinary course of trade of a porooa * 
whole of merchandise or merchandise and fixtures or substantial^ all fixtitna * 
trucks or vehicles is void as to transferor s creditors unless detailed inventory ^ ^ 
ten da>s before transfer, publication or notice of date, place and time of sale in j a ^ 
journal of parish at least 15 da)$ before transfer, and transferee gets sworn «**irifr11 
of creditors with addresses and indebtedness, notifies each personall) or by cerow 
or registered mail, ten days before transfer, and sees that purchase price goes io • * 
bona fide creditors Otherwise transferee must pa> fair value to creditors Misdea^ 
or for transferor not to give full and complete statement to transferee (T 9, §2941 at 
am'd Act 584 of 1985) 
Under Bulk Sales Lau "creditors" include onl> creditors for debts owed b> tra* 
feror before transfer, and not for debts arising afterwards By special provisiat, *, 
collector is included among creditors (T 9, §2961, as am'd Act 379 of 1985) 
See also topic Taxation subnead Payment 
GARNISHMENT: 
Caveat Fuentes v Shevin, 407 U S 67, 92 S Cl 1983, 32 L Ed 2d 556 (197:) 
held notice and an opportunit) to a heanng pnor to seizure of property consuiuuc**, 
Jy essential under due process clause 
Garnishment process ma) be issued in aid of attachment, if the attaching endacr 
has reason to believe that a third person has possession of mone> or other proper* 
belonging to the defendant The process with appropriate interrogatories aua. * 
served on the third person (C C P 2412) 
Garnishment process ma> also be used m aid of execution of a judgment MOB* § 
wnt of fieri facias (CCP 2411) JZ ' 
Reply of Garnishee—Within 15 days (five days tn City Court) after aenwe* 
citation and interrogatories, the garnishee must file sworn answers thereto,ctnwat 
there is prima facie case made against him that he is indebted to defendant tatmmm 
of claim plus costs, and interest ( C C P 2412, 2413) Interrogatories serve&cup , 
Bishee must include questions which when answered will inform court ^ t o ^ P * j£ 
defendant debtor is employed by garnishee, his wage rate, manner paid, aafltjjlkj* 
judgments or garnishments, if no longer employed, where and by whomAawa 
presently employed and residing if known to garnishee (T 13, §3924,«am1B£e 
532 of 1982) J*, 
Traverse of Repl>.—The reply of the garnishee may be traversed by the attdaaaj 
creditor and the issue raised is tned by the court ( C C P 2414) Traverse of npK* 
garnishee must be made within 15 days after service of notice of reply on pany aaaa* 
garnishment (CCP 2414) 
Seizure —If garnishee declare m his reply that be has propert), etc ,of debtor«fc 
possession, the court can order that it be turned over to shenff or constable, as tirsat 
ma) be 
^ages, salary, etc, ma) be garnished, tn which case the court, after a beanqg.%w 
the portion which is exempt (sec Exemptions) and provides for payment lojfreja* 
lushing creditor out of the balance Indebtedness to emplo)er ma) be grvenfpjg 
over garnishment (T 13, §§3921-3927) No person lending mone) at moretbaajP^j; 
per annum ma) garnish an) legally exempt salary or wages of debtor m aMp-jE^ 
force payment of debt, under penalt) of imprisonment (T 20, §32) ^° r * e r a *JS» 
be discharged because of single garnishment, and ha<> remed) for ranstateaseaMK „ 
back pa) Worker ma) be discharged if earnings are subjected to three o r y ^ y 
nishments for unrelated debts in two-year penods other than garnishment ***** 
from accident or illness causing loss of ten or more consecutive days at worVfJ-3* 
§731. as am'd Act 204 of 198^ 
See topic Exemptions subhead Earnings ' * 2 * 
j r . * 
GUARDIAN AND VNARD ^ j 3 
Persons Entitled to Tutorship —Dunng marriage father is administrator^^"1 
estate and mother when father is mentally incompetent committed mter&w, 
pnsoned or an absentee (CC 221 C C P 4501 C C P 4502 as arr d *&*zL 
1975) Parents enjo) usufruct of minor's estate but nght does not extend toiujjjjp 
to child unlesv specincalh so provided m donatior (C C 226 as am'd ***7*^» 
198<) Mother is tutnx of illegitimate child not acknowledged b> fatrrf o ' t»* r 
edged b) him without he' concurrence If both ha\e acknowledged court «*eca 
as tutor (CC 256 as am'd Act 215 of 198^) Pa-ems of mother are con*dr*f 
on death of mother of illegitimate who has not been acknowledged bv f»*h^ f*-
An 536 as am'd Act 536 of 1979) ^ ^ ^ 
Upon death of either parent tutorship of minor children belong* °f n * n \ $ * - ^ % 
mg pa e^r but survivor muM qualif\ as provided b> hiw (C C 24f a< am ^ 
of 1960) Father or mothc d\mg last orpa-entwrc iv cura'or c/sp"-^*** - ^ 
a tutor b) mill o' b) having made a decla*atn- bet ore deatl executes bHort i ^ ^ 
public and two witnesses (C C 2^) Judge ma for good reason* re'ov *fJJ?£ 
tutorship given b) surviving father or mo'her and appoint someon- e l * J ^ J j i j a 
itead (CCP 4062) Whe- tutor has no been appointed b\ fathr- €^^3SB^t 
las or if tutor is not confiTned or is excused tutor appointed rrorT" " " ^ ^ H B P ^ 
ascendant^ in direct line collaterals b) bl'XK? with r third deg te and $aTVTTfS^T 
of minor s father or mother d)ing la* (C C Act 26* as arr d Act 4 ^ J * ^£T 
there is no ascendan' nearest of kir m collatera' line is entitled tc tutor*** 
A minor not emancipated is placed unde a tuto' after dissolu* n^ o^maji-^ ^ 
parents or ther sepa-atior from bed and boa'd (C C lc" and 24t ^ ^ a* 
nag' fathers and mother have enjovmem of estate of the ' children b u 1 ^ ^ p O 
propen) belonging to childrer cannot be sold or mortgaged or an\ othe s t ^ . | g g -
regard io it except with same formalities as are presenbed in case of minors W 
See no" a* head of Dige^ - a t o c . leg sla ) r co\a3 
Vernon's 
TEXAS CODES 
ANNOTATED 
CIVIL PRACTICE AND REMEDIES CODE 
Sections 1.001 to 16.050 
ST. PAUL. MINN. 
WEST PUBLISHING CO. 
CITE THIS BOOK 
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9. Breach of marriage promise 
When there is no dispute as to the fact 
that the promise of marriage was made 
within one year before filing suit, the court 
properly refused to charge upon the issue 
made by the plea of limitation. Daggett v. 
Wallace (1890) 75 T. 352, 13 S.W. 49. 
A suit to establish a trust against a house 
and lot was not barred by one year statute 
of limitations governing actions for breach 
of promise of marriage, although plaintiff 
testified that defendant stated they would 
be married, where it could not be said as a 
matter of law when the promise of mar-
riage, if any, was breached. Davis v. Clem-
ents (Civ.App.1951) 239 S.W.2d 657, ref. 
n.r.e. 
Vernon's Ann.Civ.St. art. 5524 (repealed; 
now, this section) which barred actions for 
breach of promise to marry not brought 
within one year from accrual of cause of 
action did not bar action to cancel a deed 
procured by promise to marry, which was 
allegedly breached. Hooks v. Brown (Civ. 
App.1961) 348 S.W.2d 104, ref. n.r.e. 
In action for breach of promise of mar-
riage, wherein defendant pleaded Vernon's 
Ann.Civ.St. art. 5524 (repealed; now, this 
section) as defense, fact issue existed upon 
the resolution of which the validity of plea 
of limitation would depend, precluding sum-
was barred by one-year limitation. Seven 
One Seven Tire Service v. Firestone Tire & 
Rubber Co. (Civ.App.1927) 288 S.W. 558. 
Debtor's alleged cause of action for slan-
der against creditor for words uttered by 
creditors agent upon failure of debtor to 
pay indebtedness did not arise out of the 
same transaction which was the basis for 
creditor's suit for debt, and debtor's cross 
action was barred by the one-year statute 
of limitations. Swaim v. International Har-
vester Co. (Civ.App.1974) 505 S.W.2d 634, 
ref. n.r.e. 
Debtor's mention in his answer filed in 
suit on indebtedness that debtor intended to 
file cross action for damages for slander did 
not protect debtor so that his later-filed suit 
by way of cross action praying for recover}' 
of damages flowing therefrom was not sub-
ject to creditor's limitation plea. Swaim v. 
International Harvester Co. (Civ.App. 1974) 
505 S.W.2d 634, ref. n.r.e. 
11. Summary judgment 
Defendant who establishes in summary 
judgment proceeding the applicability of a 
statute of limitations is entitled to prevail 
unless plaintiff comes forward with proof 
showing some excuse for delay. McClel-
land v. Peterson (Civ.App.1973) 494 S.W.2d 
583. 
§ 16.003. Two-Year Limitations Period 
(a) A person must bring suit for trespass for injury to the estate or to 
the property of another, conversion of personal property, taking or 
detaining the personal property of another, personal injury, forcible 
entry and detainer, and forcible detainer not later than two years after 
the day the cause of action accrues. 
(b) A person must bring suit not later than two years after the day the 
cause of action accrues in an action for injury resulting in death. The 
cause of action accrues on the death of the injured person. 
Revisor's Note 
(1) The revised law omits the reference to firms and public and 
private corporations in the source law. The Code Construction Act 
(V.A.C.S. Article 5429b-2) includes business entities and governmental 
entities within the definition of "person." 
(2) The revised law omits the source law material that provides for 
suits to be brought within two years of the effective date of V.A.C.S. 
Article 5526a (March 7, 1934) because the two-year period has expired. 
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by which statute might be tolled. Phipps v. 
Chrysler Corp. (Civ.App.1970) 460 S.W.2d 
170, error refused. 
Where plaintiff in personal injury and 
property damage suit admitted doing noth-
ing to have citation both issued and served 
upon one defendant, a resident of county in 
which suit was brought, from period De-
cember 19, 1967 to November, 1969, plain-
tiff did not exercise due diligence, and his 
excuse that he feared being brought to trial 
without both defendants being in court and 
possibility of dismissal for want of prosecu-
tion pending service on another defendant 
was insufficient to toll statute of limitation. 
Green v. Steigerwald (Civ.App.1971) 468 
S.W.2d 122. 
Under Vernon's Ann.Civ.St. art. 5526 (re-
pealed; now, this section), mere filing of 
suit would not interrupt running of statute 
of limitations; to interrupt running of stat-
ute, not only must petition have been filed 
but use of due diligence in procuring is-
suance and service of citation was required. 
Walker v. Hanes (Civ.App. 1978) 570 S.W.2d 
534, ref. n.r.e. 
Due diligence in procuring issuance of 
citation and its service upon defendant was 
not established so as to interrupt or toll 
running of two-year period of limitations in 
action for property damage arising from 
automobile collision where delay on part of 
plaintiff in seeking issuance of an alias cita-
tion for a period in excess of six months 
was unexplained. Hamilton v. Goodson 
(Civ.App.1979) 578 S.W.2d 448. 
Where after plaintiff in personal injury 
action requested clerk to issue citation for 
defendant, which was returned unserved, 
there was total inaction by plaintiff during 
17-month period after expiration of limita-
tions period before service was completed, 
with no additional attempts to obtain ser-
vice and attempt to determine whether ser-
vice was completed, there was lack of dil-
igence by plaintiff in procuring issuance 
and service of citation, and thus, statute of 
limitations was not tolled and barred plain-
tiffs action. Reynolds v. Alcorn (Civ.App. 
1980) 601 S.W.2d 785. 
442. Dismissal, tolling statute of limita-
tions 
Where former wife's first suit for parti-
tion of former husband's military retire-
ment benefits was dismissed for want of 
prosecution, that suit did not interrupt run-
ning of statute of limitations. Shaw v. Cor-
coran (Civ.App.1978) 570 S.W.2d 96. 
443. Review, tolling statute of limitations 
Where patient did not urge to trial court 
issues of whether statute of limitations on 
medical malpractice claim was tolled based 
on discovery rule or fraudulent conceal-
ment, patient failed to preserve for appeal 
complained of error'in grant of physician's 
summary judgment motion based on limita-
tions defense. Jean v. Jones (App. 1 Dist. 
1983) 663 S.W.2d 56, ref. n.r.e. 
§ 16.004. Four-Year Limitations Period 
(a) A person must bring suit on the following actions not later than 
four years after the day the cause of action accrues: 
(1) specific performance of a contract for the conveyance of real 
property; 
(2) penalty or damages on the penal clause of a bond to convey real 
property; or 
(3) debt. 
(b) A person must bring suit on the bond of an executor, administra-
tor, or guardian not later than four years after the day of the death, 
resignation, removal, or discharge of the executor, administrator, or 
guardian. 
(c) A person must bring suit against his partner for a settlement of 
partnership accounts, and must bring an action on an open or stated 
account, or on a mutual and current account concerning the trade of 
merchandise between merchants or their agents or factors, not later than 
1 V.T.C.A.Gv.Prac. & Rem.Code—16 451 
four years after the day that the cause of action accrues. For purposes 
of this subsection, the cause of action accrues on the day that the 
dealings in which the parties were interested together cease. 
Historical Note 
Prior Law: G.L. vol. 8, p. 938. 
,OA. „ 0 Rev.Civ.St.1895, arts. 3356, 3357, 3360. 
*
c}* }%]* L l ™ Rev.Civ.St.1911, arts. 5688, 5689, 5692. 
P.D. 137o, 3923, 4604.
 A c t s 1917> 3 5 t h ^ 3 r d C.S., p. 87. 
Acts 1876, p. 102. Acts 1979, 66th Leg., p. 1769, ch. 716, § 2. 
G.L. vol. 2, p. 627. Vernon's Ann.Civ.St. arts. 5527, 5528, 
Rev.Civ.St.1879, arts. 3205, 3206, 3209. 5531. 
Cross References 
Bonds of public officers, actions on, see Vernon's Ann.Civ.St. art. 6003a. 
Statute of limitations in contracts for sale, see V.T.C.A. Bus. & C. § 2.725. 
Law Review Commentaries 
Analysis of 1979 amendments to Decep- Implied warranty of habitability: Con-
tive Trade Practices Act. Robert E. Good- tract or tort? 31 Baylor LRev. 207 (1979). 
friend and Michael P. Lynn, 33 Southwest-
 t . , A. . _ „. v 
ern LJ. (Tex, 999 (1979). w J S e t S ^ ^ S S ( S " * 
Annual survey of Texas law: 
Civil procedure. Ernest E. Figari, Jr., Jf***™Im ^ l , * * * 6 ^ ^ 
34 Southwestern LJ. (Tex.) 415 34 Baylor LRev. 269 (1982). 
(1980). Professional malpractice: Extent of liabil-
Property insurance. Arno W. Krebs, ity in Texas and elsewhere. Steven K. 
Jr., and Otway B. Denny, Jr., 35 Ward, 42 Texas Bar J. 117 (1979). 
Southwestern LJ. (Tex.) 256 (1981). 
Purchase and sales of real property. Security deposits with utilities. 21 South-
Lawrence J. Brannian, 35 Southwest- western LJ. (Tex.) 857 (1967). 
ern LJ. (Tex.) 53 (1981). Statutory damages recovery: Uninsured 
Secured transactions. John Krahmer
 motorist statute. Howard L. Nations, 18 
L , e S t € r n LJ' a e X , ) South Texas LJ. 329 (1977). 
(1980). 
Support. Ellen K. Solender, 35 South- Uninsured motorist coverage: Relief in 
western LJ. (Tex.) 163 (1981). Texas from financially irresponsible motor-
Wills. Charles 0. Galvin, 34 South- ist. David J. Beck, 32 Texas Bar J. 93 
western LJ. (Tex.) 21 (1980). (1969). 
Library References 
West's Tex. Forms, Civil Trial and Appel-
late Practice, Ch. 5. 
Notes of Decisions 
I. IN GENERAL 1-140 
I I . ACCRUAL OF CAUSE OF ACTION 141-240 
III. TOLLING OF LIMITATIONS 241-320 
IV. PROCEDURE 321-338 
In general 1-140 Absence from state, tolling of limitations 
Abandonment of action, tolling of limita- 248 
tions 266 
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TEXAS LAW DlUfcSi 
^ continued 
l^\or*s Lien.—See topic Commercial Code. 
j^ment Lien.—See topic Judgments. 
dlord's Uen.—See topic Landlord and Tenant. 
IMS on Exempt Property.—See topic Exemptions. 
I * * 
oo Homestead.—See topic Homesteads. 
_ j Estate Mortgage Lien.—See topic Mortgages of Real Property. 
f n Lien.—See topic Taxation. 
UMTTATIONOF ACTIONS: 
inform Commercial Code enacted. (Bus. & Comm. C. Title 1). See topic Com-
^^ctt! Code 
anions must be brought within following times: 
Tn rears: on judgments, domestic or foreign, except that foreign judgment barred 
• y entered in less than ten years is barred likewise in this state (Civ. P. Rem. Code 
l • 0t*{&]); action to recover land, when instrument of record is defective in certain 
n^-ulars such as record not showing seal of officer taking acknowledgment, or 
i^ rumeni not being signed by proper officer, etc. (Civ. P, Rem Code §16.033); to 
^ncr damages arising out of defective or unsafe conditions of real property against 
av r«rfonning construction or repair thereto (Civ. P. Rem. Code §16.009); to recov-
c d*mapes caused by error in survey conducted by registered public surveyor or 
txcsed state land surveyor, except if written claim presented during ten-year period, 
*~ period extended two years from date claim presented. (Civ. P. Rem. Code 
|lt011). 
fto years: action on officer's bond for failure to make return of execution. (Civ. P. 
ICE Code §16.007). 
fts? years: actions for debt; actions for penalty or for damages on penal clause of 
ttad to convey real estate; actions by one partner against his co-partner for settlement 
* l»rmership accounts, actions upon stated or open accounts, or upon mutual and 
a%rect accounts concerning trade of merchandise between merchant and merchant, 
4tor (actors or agents; and cause of action shall be considered as having accrued on 
Wmuion of dealings in which they were interested together (Civ. P. Rem. Code 
fit004); on notes secured by deeds, mortgages, or deeds of trust, or vendor's bens 
•tamed in deeds of conveyance, or vendor's hen notes for purchase money, time 
mumf from maturity of debt (Ci*. P. Rem. Code $16,035); for specific performance 
* contracts to convey real estate (Civ. P. Rem. Code §16 004[a] [ 1 ]); suits on bond 
rf executor, administrator or guardian, time running from death, resignation, removal 
m discharge of executor, etc. (Civ. P. Rem. Code § 16.004 [b]); on all causes not 
•Wrrise specified (Civ. P. Rem. Code §16.051). See also topic Commercial Code. As 
* Kits for defalcation on bonds of public officials, see 6003a. 
•Vte years: by or against carriers of property for hire for charges or overcharges, 
ffcv p. Rem. Code §16.006). 
two years: for injuries to person or property; for death, time running from death; 
** detaining personal property and converting same to own use, for taking or carry-
^ iway goods or chattels of another; for forcible entry and detainer (Civ. P. Rem. 
fctfe §16.003); will contests (Prob. C. §93). 
Ox yean for injuries to character or reputation; for malicious prosecution, seduc-
* * or breach of promise to marry. (Civ. P. Rem. Code §16.002). 
Sii aionths: actions under bulk transfer provisions of U.C.C. 
Extension of Limitations Period.—If last day of limitations period under any stat-
•* of limitations falls on Sat., Sun., or holiday, period for filing suit is extended to 
*=*•• day that county offices are open for business. (Civ. P. Rem. Code §16.072). 
**• Action.—When an action is dismissed or judgment set aside or annulled in a 
~ « proceeding because of lack of jurisdiction of trial court, and within 60 days 
•Rafter action is commenced in proper court, period between date of first filing and 
**' of commencement of action in proper court is not counted as pan of period of 
•^'•itJon, unless first filing was intentional disregard of jurisdiction. (Civ. P. Rem. 
^•§16.064). 
^•reigr Causes of Action.—No statutory provision regarding foreign causes of 
w* LT **owevcr' anions based upon foreign judgment or decree are barred if by laws 
toragr state or country such action would there be barred and judgment or decree 
*&=»pab!e of being otherwise enforced there; and whether so barred or not, no action 
jr*;riSi person who shall have resided in this State during ten years next preceding 
~ ^ action shall be brought upon any such judgment or decree rendered more than 
years before commencement of such action (Civ. P. Rem Code §16.066). 
^©nihilities °f Plaintiff.—Time does not run against insane persons, persons under 
.^*ea-5> of age, or during war, as to real estate against persons in military or naval 
^>«* of federal government, handicapped persons who because of handicap are 
••* to determine thai property is under adverse possession, or elderly persons who 
•*^e of advanced age are unable to determine that property is under adverse pos-
or. but no action to recover real property may be brought more than 25 years 
"5J*USC accrued. (Civ. P. Rem Code §§16.001, 16.022, 16.027). 
"eath.—in case of death of person against whom or in whose favor a cause of 
^
x
- exists, time ceases to run until 12 months after such death, unless an adminis-
. 7 °r executor sooner qualifies, in which case time ceases to run only until such 
* * ^ : i o n (Civ P. Rem Code §16.062). 
1^J*ence or Concealment of Defendant.—The time during which a defendant is 
i.» / fr°m the state is deducted from the penod of limitation (Civ. P. Rem Code 
^r^terclaim or Cross Action.—If at time required by law for answer to plaintiffs 
t*. r' defendant's counterclaim or cross action would otherwise be barred by appli-
g^- statute °f limitation, penod of limitations is extended 30 days following answer 
" ^
 0r
 counterclaim or cross action arising out of same transaction or occurence 
:
 Object matter of opposing parry's claim (Gv. P. Rem Code §lo.069) 
Revival of Barred Claims.—A debt barred by limitation may be revived only b> 
acknowledgment in writing, signed by person to be charged. (Civ. P. Rem. Ci 
§16.065). Judgment where no execution issued within 12 months after rendition n 
be revived by scire facias or action of debt brought within ten years. (Civ. p R ( 
Code §31.006). 
Extension of maturity of any evidence of indebtedness secured by mortgage, deec 
trust or vendor's lien on real property must be in writing, signed, acknowledged,
 : 
recorded, as in case of a mortgage. (Civ. P. Rem. Code §16.036). 
Contractual Limitations.—Time within which to sue may not be limited by c 
tract to less than two years unless contract is for sale of business entity
 ancj 
aggregate vaJue not less than $500,000 (Civ. P. Rem. Code §16.070), and eXcer 
extent permitted under Uniform Commercial Code. See topic Commercial Code. C 
tractua! stipulation requiring claimant to give notice of claim of damages as c0nd 
precedent to right to sue must be reasonable. Notification period of less than 9rj <L 
void. Notice is presumed unless lack of notice is specifically pleaded under oath e> 
where contract is for sale of business entity and has value not less than $500,000 ( 
P. Rem. Code §16.071). 
Pleading.—To be available as a defense limitations must be pleaded. (Rule 9-
Immigrants may not be sued on causes of action barred in state or country 
which they emigrated prior to emigration. Action not barred at time of rernov 
Texas is not barred until immigrant has resided in state for one year. (Civ. p ] 
Code §16.067). 
See also topic Adverse Possession. 
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP: See Partnership. 
MARRIAGE. 
Person under 18 years may not marry without: (i) consent of parent or guard 
(ii) court order. Person under 14 years may not marry without court order. (Fa 
§§1.51-1.53). 
Medical Examination.—No statutory provision. 
license required, it is procured from any county clerk. (Fam. C. §1.07). 
parties must appear in person unless county judge waives requirement of pe 
appearance. (Fam. C. §1.02). License becomes invalid unless marriage has bee 
ducted within 30 days after license issued. (Fam. C §§1.81). 
Hairing Period.—No statutory provision. 
Ceremonial marriage may be performed by: licensed or ordained Christian rr 
or priest; Jewish rabbi; officer of religious organization authorized by organic 
perform marriage ceremonies; justice of peace; judge of any court of record. j 
justice of peace nor judge of any court of record can discriminate on basis
 ( 
religion, or national origin. (Fam. C §1.83). 
Reports of Marriages.—Clerk records all licenses issued. Person solemnize 
of matrimony must endorse same on license and return it to county clerk wi 
days after celebration; return is recorded with license. (Fam. C. §1.84). 
Record.—-Sec topic Records, subhead Vital Statistics. 
Common law marriages, both local and out-of-state, are recognized. (191 
495; Fam. C §1.91-95). 
Proxy Marriages.—Ceremonial marriage performed by a proxy under p 
attorney, where couple was separated by military service, is legal marriage, a 
band can be guilty of offense of desertion. (Op. Atty. Gen. 1946, No. 0-7529 
Marriages by Written Contract.—No statutory provision 
Prohibited Marriages.—Person may not marry his or her aunt or uncle, ne 
niece (including half-blood or by adoption) or any nearer relative by consar 
or stepparent or stepchild. Such marriages are void (Fam C. §2.21). 
Foreign marriage recognized unless contrary to policy of state. 
Annulment.—A marriage may be annulled for natural or incurable imp^ 
the time of entering into the marriage contract, or for any other impedir 
renders such contract voidable. (Fam C. §§2.41-.46). Statutory time limk 
annulment for nonage is 90 days after date of marriage. (Fam. C. §2.41). 
MARRIED WOMEN: 
See topics Dower; Executors and Administrators, Homesteads; Husband . 
Marriage, Wills, Witnesses. 
MASTER AND SERVANT: 
See topic Labor Relations; also Principal and Agent. 
MECHANICS' LIENS: See Liens 
MINES AND MINERALS. 
Operation of Mines.—-Note: 5901 -5920a, governing health and safet> 
were repealed by 19SQ H.B 863. Department of Licensing and Regulation 
govern (9100). Statute is unclear 
Safeguarding of Employees.—Rules of safety formerly governed by 5 
Occupational Safety Board can enact safet\ rules applicable to industry 
(5182a). 
Inspection of Mines.—See subhead Operation of Mines, supra 
Oil and Gas—Railroad Commission has duty of enforcing statutory reg 
oil and gas industry, which include extensive conservation laws (N.R.C 
leases on state lands must provide that no gas will be sold for use outside s 
permission from Texas Railroad Commission is obtained and any lease no: 
tng is void (N.R.C. §§52.292-52.296) Railroad Commission is authorize,: 
pooling of mineral interests for oil and gas well under certain conditior 
§102) Railroad Commission is authorized to approve designation by d^  
See note at head of Digest as to 1992 legislation covered 
Set T opical Index in fron! part of \\\\- volume 
'iw*> Pierce Fenner 8 Smith Inc. 
Dear Customer, 
We have received from you certificates for the securities indicated below. However in order to process 
them and make good delivery it is necessary that the power of assignment bearing your signature be 
attached to the certificate(s) since it does not bear your endorsement. Therefore will you please sign 
the power below and return it to us in the enclosed envelope. 
Your prompt attention to this matter will be greatly appreciated. 
IRREVOCABLE STOCK OR BOND POWER 
Jf or Value iUceibcb, the undersigned does (do) hereby sell, assign and transfer to 
£ ^
 r t £L £LL n s. 
(SOCIAL SECURITY OR TAXPAYER ID NUMBER/ 
'OMPLETE 1 ^ V ^ ° sharps of thp gomr^o^ stork of 7) \ <>L ' j * r (X f\ ->yS-fer^ / t J n f 
HIS PORTION J represented by certificate (s ) Nn(s) . 293? inclusive, 
standing in the name of the undersigned on the books of said Company. 
F BONDS, 
JOMPLETE 
HIS PORTION 
.bonds of. 
in the principal amount of $. .No(s) . 
.inclusive, 
\ standing in the name of the undersigned on the books of said Company. 
The undersigned does (do) hereby irrevocably constitute and appoint 
attorney to transfer 
the said stock or bond(s), as the case may be, on the books of said Company, with full 
power of substitution in the premises. 
FOR OFFICE USE ONLY 
TITLE WHICH APPEARS ON CERTIFICATE 
TITLE WHICH APPEARS ON CERTIFICATE 
IMPORTANT: The signature(s) to this power must correspond 
with the name(s) as written upon the face of the certificate(s) 
or bond(s) in every particular without alteration. 
^yy^tTy*^ Tyr^Jh//^ 
(PERSON(S) EXECUTING THIS POWER SIGN(S) HERE) 
P^FTCTIFFS 
| EXHIBIT 
A 
Account No. 
Dated 
CODE 132 REV. 12/76 PRINTED IN U.S.A. 
THE CORPORATION WILL FURNISH WITHOUT CHARGE TO EACH STOCKHOLDER WHO , 
SO REQUESTS THE POWERS. DESIGNATIONS, PREFERENCES AND RELATIVE, PARTICI- ' 
PATING, OPTIONAL OR OTHER SPECIAL RIGHTS OF EACH CLASS OF STOCK OR SERIES 
THEREOF AND THE QUALIFICATIONS, LIMITATIONS OR RESTRICTIONS OF SUCH PREF-
ERENCES AND/OR RIGHTS. 
Tlje following abbreviations, when used m the inscription on the face of this certificate, shall be construed as though 
they were written out in full according to applicable laws or regulations: 
TEN C0M - as tenants in common I M F GIFT MIN ACT— Custodian (Cust) (.Minor) 
TEN ENT — as tenants by the entirety under Uniform Gifts to Minors 
JT TEN — a- joint tenants with nwh* of 
survivorship and not as truants Act 
in common (State) 
Additional abbreviations may also be used though not in the above list. 
P L E A S E INSCWT S O C I A L SECURITY O » OTHER 
I D E N T I F Y I N G K C M B E * * OR ASSIGNEE S 
PLEASE PRINT OR TYPEWRITE NAME AND ADDRESS INCLUDING POSTAL ZIP CODE OF ASSIGNEE 
~r> 
ry //*/ fYf/ti/Hfj/f'tK •rr/trriJr,ti/r</Y't/ .//tr ////////* Tu/'///fr///f„ 
,/ltt/////; /trrr/'t/ tirrrofY//'ft/- /Y'/t/)/f/<//<*/ti//s//////>t it/ 
_ ^ . __.___._v . ,J4&////!^ 
//y//Y/>u/// ///rjs/u/j/s/r//>// ////:ywtiy//////'j/'fy/u'M'-jis/,m/!r/ 
rw/u'jr////'// ifi/ft f*t//.fiwrt /j/.U//'j//////</>// tit //" /twmtMi 
MO'tll (Ml SK.M.tWt[ U TMI1 4 1 t l t « * t N 1 a v t l C O t l l t ' O N O »1T» 1M| * . M | At • f l t T O WHfm TM • * ( ! 
0* 1MI C f l t l « I C « l | M | « t l l F A t l l C V I l t •>T«0U1 *LHI*TlO« Ot t « U * t C I "! •" ' M »«» t M W I » » A t l V f l 
SIGNATURE GUARANTEED 
"THE SHARES REPRESENTED BY THIS CERTIFICATE HAVE NOT BEEN REGISTERED 
UNDER EITHER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933, AS AMENDED, OR APPLICABLE 
BLUE SKY LAVS. THEY MAY NOT BE SOLD, OFFERED FOR SALE OR TRANSFERRED 
IN THE ABSENCE OF AN EFFECTIVE REGISTRATION UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT 
OF 1933, AS AMENDED, AND THE APPLICABLE BLUE SKY LAVS OR AN OPINION 
OF COUNSEL SATISFACTORY IN FORM AND SUBSTANCE TO COUNSEL FOR THE 
COMPANY' THAT SUCK TRANSACTION WILL NOT RESULT IN A PROHIBITED 
TRANSACTION UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933, AS AMENDED, OR THE 
APPLICABLE BLUE SKY LAVS." 
m^'w^w-wom 
INCORPORATED UNDER THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
DIGITRAN SYSTEMS, INCORPORATED 
THIS CERTIFIES THAT ***LORETTA PENFOLD RECORDS*** 
F49999 
HT 
SEE REVERSE SIDE 
FOR CERTAIN DEFINITIONS 
is the owner of III CKI 
***THIRTY TWO THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED NINETY*** 
FULLY PAID AND NON-ASSESSABLE SHARES OF COMMON STOCK, $.01 PAR VALUE, OF 
- DIGITRAN SYSTEMS, INCORPORATED ^ = ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ = 
transferable on the books of the Corporation by the holder hereof in person or by duly authorized attorney on surrender of 
this certificate properly endorsed. This certificate is not valid unless countersigned by the Transfer Agent and Registrar. 
WITNESS the facsimile signatures of the Corporation *s duly authorized officers. 
Dated: 04/27/87 
/$UWW0SW9. 
SUMMARY dF THE OFFERING EX. 3 3 - 3< 
THE EXCHANGE 
OFFER 
The Limited Partners may exchange their part-
nership interest in the Partnership in return 
for common stock in Digitran Systems, Inc. 
In exercising such option, the Limited Partner 
will be required to pay $30,400 in cash, based 
on each 1 Unit of the Partnership owned by a 
Limited Partner which is being exchanged. On 
the exercise of each Exchange Offer, Digitran 
Systems Inc., will be released from all obli-
gations involving that certain Guaranty and 
Assumption Agreement entered by said Limited 
Partners of the formation of the Partnership, 
and will further receive a return of their 
Promissory Note which was contributed to Part-
nership on its formation. 
THE PARTNERSHIP Crane Development Limited Partnership, a 
Louisiana limited partnership. 
THE GENERAL The General Partner is Simulator Research, Inc., 
PARTNER a Louisiana Corporation. 
The principal office of the Partnership is 109 
Michelle Circle, Lafayette, La. 70503. 
STOCK Each Limited Partner accepting the Exchange Offer 
will receive 40,533 shares of common stock in 
Digitran Systems, Inc. for each Unit of limited 
partnership interest in the Partnership 
exchanged. These shares of stock will be subject 
to substantial restrictions on their transfer-
rability. Digitran is a public corporation, with 
its principal place of business in Lafayette, 
Louisiana. 
ROYALTY 
AGREEMENTS Each Limited Partner who accepts the Exchange 
Offer yill not be entitled to the right to future 
revenues realized by the Partnership from the 
sale of crane simulators. 
INVESTOR 
QUALIFICATIONS An investor must be a Class A or Class B 
Limited Partner in Crane Development Limited 
Partnership. 
NO LIQUIDITY 
OF STOCK A public market is not presently available to 
trade the stock of Dig it ran acquired under the 
Exchange Offer as the stock is subject to fed-
eral and state securities laws. 
NO TAX RULING A ruling will not be obtained from the Internal 
Revenue Service regarding the federal tax conse-
quences associated with a limited partner accept-
ing the Exchange Offer. 
-2-
October 8,1987 
Dear Mr. Gary Briggs 
This letter is to confirm our conversation pertaining to 
my stock of 32190 shares in certificate #2939. We are presently 
in an underwriting and as soon as we are finished with this 
project we will complete a Form D to issue you 40,533 shares of 
restricted stock. At that time you will return my personal stock 
to me. 
Sincerely yours, 
Loretta P. Records 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF CACHE 
STATE OF UTAH 
LORETTA PENFOLD RECORDS, a/k/a 
LORETTA 
vs. 
GARY M. 
GALLENT 
Petitioner, 
BRIGGS 
Respondent. 
* 
* 
• 
• 
* 
* 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
No. 920000001 
This matter is before the Court upon Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment on the grounds that Plaintiff's action is barred 
by the Statute of Limitations or alternatively by the Statute of 
Frauds. Plaintiff has also filed a Motion for Summary Judgment 
on the grounds that Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law based on undisputed facts set forth in Defendant's 
deposition and Plaintiff's affidavit. The same was argued on the 
27th day of July, 199 3 and taken under advisement. 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
Defendant argues that Plaintiff's action is barred by the 
** o^Statute of Limitations. Upon reflection of those arguments made 
V If jcW by the parties and in review of the exhibits presented to the 
\ [ 
li6K Court, the Court finds that the issue is one of contract and is 
* ' not barred by the Statute of Limitation. 
MICRO FILMED 
DATE: f?/<*[<?3 
Case Ho 3k& 
- t t fc 4*6 
STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
Defendant argues that exhibit 6, the Irrevocable Stock 
Power, is the only admissible evidence of the transaction 
concerning the 32,190 shares of stock. He claims that the 
exhibit is clear on its face and any other document or testimony 
explaining it is barred by the parole evidence rule. As such# 
Defendant argues that Plaintiff has no action against Defendant. 
The Court does not agree. 
Exhibit 6 is only one a series of documents in a transaction 
between Plaintiff and Defendant. There is sufficient question, 
as to why these shares of stock were transferred, to support the 
admission of other evidence explaining the context and 
understanding of the parties at the time of transfer. 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff argues that the agreement between the parties is 
clear, leaving no genuine issue of material fact and entitling 
Plaintiff to judgment as a matter of law. 
It is undisputed that Defendant entered into an agreement to 
prepay the class note to Digitran. As a part of the agreement 
Defendant elected to pay $30,400, half the value of the original 
note, in cash to Crane Development Limited Partnership. The 
following was part of the consideration given to Defendant for 
the prepayment: (1) Defendant's promissory note would be 
canceled and delivered to him, (2) Digicrane would execute an 
amendment to the Guaranty and Assumption Agreement, (3) Defendant 
2 
would receive one share of Common Stock from Digitran for each 
$0.75 contributed by Defendant in cash upon the execution of the 
Agreement. Defendant paid the $30,400 and was guaranteed to 
receive the stock by June 1, 1986. 
By October 1987, Defendant had still not received the stock 
from Digitran as promised. Defendant met with Plaintiff at this 
time and received 32,190 shares of Plaintiff's personal stock. 
Defendant's own testimony as to this transaction explained that 
the delivery of the stock was "security for the good faith 
performance . . . by Digicrane/Digitran." 
A year later, November 22, 1988, Defendant received a stock 
certificate from Digitran for 40,533 shares of stock, the amount 
of stock owed from the prepayment agreement. An interest payment 
was also paid April 1988 to Defendant in the amount of $1824 to 
compensate him for the delay. 
Defendant has not returned the 32,190 shares of stock given 
him in 1987 by Plaintiff. He claims they were to act as 
security, not only for the 40,533 shares of stock, but to ensure 
good faith efforts from the company for other difficulties 
Defendant was having, particularly the payment of royalties from 
Digicrane. Plaintiff has brought this action to recover this 
stock. 
The 32,190 shares of stock given to Defendant by Plaintiff 
were admittedly given as "security for a good faith performance." 
They were delivered at a time when Digitran had still not 
delivered the 4 0,53 3 shares of stock pursuant to the prepayment 
3 
agreement. There was no other clear obligation at that time to 
Defendant. It is apparent Defendant feels he has a right to 
receive royalty payments from Digicrane or Digitran. Whether he 
is correct in this claim is not an issue before this Court. 
Defendant has received the stock promised him in the prepayment 
agreement. Defendant has failed to establish why he is entitled 
to retain the other 32,190 shares. Plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment is granted. Counsel for Plaintiff is directed 
to prepare a formal order in conformance herewith. 
Dated this / day of August, 1993. 
4 
Case No: 920000001 CN 
Certificate of Mailing 
I certify that on the 5 *~ day of (2<"Aj.^-f j3l3—> 
I sent by first class mail a true and correct copy of the 
attached document to the following: 
JOSEPH CHAMBERS 
Atty for Defendant 
31 FEDERAL AVENUE 
LOGAN UT 84321 
GARY N. ANDERSON 
Atty for Plaintiff 
175 EAST 100 NORTH 
LOGAN UT 84321 
GEORGE W. PRESTON 
Atty for Defendant 
31 FEDERAL AVENUE 
LOGAN UT 84321 
District Court Clerk 
By: 
Deputy Clerk 
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT. COUNTY OF CACHE 
STATE OF UTAH 
LORETTA PENFOLD RECORDS, 
aka LORETTA GALLANT, 
Plaintiff 
VS. 
GARY M. BRIGGS, 
Defendant 
THIS MATTER IS BEFORE THE COURT on an Objection to the 
Proposed Findings of Fact and Order. The Objection is overruled. 
This Memorandum will serve as notice that the Findings and Order, 
as proposed, have been signed and entered. 
Qfih 
DATED this n day of September. 1993. 
FIRST DISTRICT COURT 
* MEMORANDUM DECISION 
* Case No. 920000001 
* 
BY THE COUR 
GORDON J. LOW 
RECORDS aka GALLANT v. BRIGGS 
Case No. 920000001 
Page 2 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing MEMORANDUM DECISION, Loretta Penfold Records aka Gallant 
v. Gary M. Briggs, Case No. 920000001, postage prepaid, this 
day of September, 1993, to the following attorneys: 
q^ 
GREGORY SKABELUND 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
2176 North Main 
North Logan, Utah 84321 
GARY N. ANDERSON 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Hillyard, Anderson & Olsen 
175 East 100 North 
Logan, Utah 84321 
GEORGE W. PRESTON 
Attorney for Defendant 
Preston & Chambers 
31 Federal Avenue 
Logan, Utah 84321 
JOSEPH M. CHAMBERS 
Attorney for Defendant 
Preston & Chambers 
31 Federal Avenue 
Logan, Utah 84321 
*L 
Court Secretary 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF CACHE 
STATE OF UTAH 
LORETTA PENFOLD RECORDS, 
aka LORETTA GALLANT, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
GARY M. BRIGGS, 
Defendant 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 920000001 
THIS MATTER IS BEFORE THE COURT upon an Objection to the 
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. As noted in the 
Plaintiff's response9 much of the argument by the Defendant is not 
to the form of the Findings but to the Memorandum Decision itself. 
For those reasons and to the reasons that the Court finds the 
proposed Findings and Order comport with the Memorandum Decision 
and with the evidence at trial, reflected in the Memorandum 
Decision or not, the Objection is overruled and this Memorandum 
will serve as Notice of Entry that the proposed Findings and Order 
have been adopted and docketed by the Court. 
DATED this day of September, 199>-7 
BY THE 
JE GORDON J. LOW 
FIRST DISTRICT COURT 
RECORDS aka GALLANT v. BRIGGS 
Case No. 920000001 
Page 2 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing MEMORANDUM DECISION. Loretta Penfold Records aka Gallant 
v. Gary M. Briggs, Case No. 920000001, postage prepaid, this 
day of September, 1993, to the following
 tattorneys: 
GREGORY SKABELUND 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
2176 North Main 
North Logan, Utah 84321 
GARY N. ANDERSON 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Hillyard, Anderson & Olsen 
175 East 100 North 
Logan, Utah 84321 
GEORGE W. PRESTON 
Attorney for Defendant 
Preston & Chambers 
31 Federal Avenue 
Logan, Utah 84321 
JOSEPH M. CHAMBERS 
Attorney for Defendant 
Preston & Chambers 
31 Federal Avenue 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Pp. Sin. 
Court Secretary 
Gc N. A n d e r s o n # 8 8 0 0 
Hi—YARD, ANDERSON & OLSEN 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
A T T O R N E Y S A T L-AW 
175 EAST FIRST NORTH 
L O G A N , U T A H 84321 
TELEPHONE (601) 752-2610 
TELEFAX (801) 753-8895 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LORETTA PENFOLD RECORDS, 
a/k/a LORETTA GALLENT, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GARY M. BRIGGS, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW .. 
Civil No. 92-01 
Judge Gordon J. Low cA 
This matter came before this Court on the basis of 
Defendant's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that 
Plaintiff's action is barred by an applicable statute of 
limitations or by an applicable statute of frauds. 
Plaintiff also filed a motion for summary judgment on the 
grounds that Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law based on undisputed facts set forth in Defendant's 
deposition and Plaintiff's affidavit. Oral argument was had 
on both motions on July 27, 1993, at which time the Court 
took the matter under advisement and issued a memorandum 
decision which sets forth the following Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
1. As to the statute of limitations argument, the 
statutes of four states could be involved, namely 
MICRO FILMED 
DATE: Risim 
Louisiana, Colorado, Texas and Utah. Defendant asserted 
initially that the Utah statutes applied, but, being faced 
with the statute that tolls the time in Utah as long as the 
Defendant was out-of-state, he changed his position and 
claimed that the Texas statute for recovery of personal 
- property was applicable. Defendant concedes that if 
o 
i Plaintiff's action is based on contract claims, none of the 
< 
2- statutes in the four states would have run by the time the 
< 
o 
3 action was filed. The Court having examined the pleadings 
i 
g and exhibits finds that the issue in the case is one of 
z 
£ contract. 
n 
2 2. On the statute of frauds argument, Defendant argues 
10 
- that exhibit 6 to Defendant's deposition, which has been 
z 
u 
13 filed with the Court and admitted to evidence along with the 
z deposition and the remaining deposition exhibits, is the 
o 
g only admissible evidence of the transaction concerning the 
z 
< 
6 32,190 shares of stock which is the subject of this action. 
< 
> 
J Defendant claims that the exhibit is clear on its face and 
X 
2 any other document or testimony explaining it is barred by 
u. 
° the parole ev dence rule. T e Court has examined the 
< 
evidenc  relating t  th  ransaction between the Plaintiff
and Defendant and finds that there is sufficient question as 
to why these shares of stock were transferred to support the 
admission of other evidence explaining the context and 
understanding of the parties at the time of transfer. The 
Court also finds that the complete transaction between the 
• 2 -
CD 
I 
< 
D 
parties can only be ascertained by reviewing the series of 
documents in evidence relating to the transaction. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
RE: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
3. Plaintiff argues that the agreement between the 
parties is clear, leaving no genuine issue of material fact 
and entitling Plaintiff to judgment as a matter of law. It 
is undisputed that Defendant entered into an agreement to z 
< 
o 
3 prepay the partnership note owed to Crane Development 
g Limited Partnership, by paying the amount of $30,400, half 
z 
I-
{? the value of the original note. Part of the consideration 
S given to Defendant for the prepayment was: (1) Defendant's 
UJ 
10 
- promissory note would be canceled and delivered to him; 
z' 
UJ 
3 (2) Digicrane would execute an amendment to the Guaranty and 
z Assumption Agreement; (3) Defendant would receive one share 
c: 
kJ 
o 
z 
< 
of Common Stock from Digitran for each $0.75 contributed by 
g Defendant in cash upon the execution of the Agreement,. 
< 
>
d Defendant paid the $30,400 and was guaranteed to receive the 
i 
8 stock by June 1, 1986. 
iZ 
° 4. By October 1987, Defendant had still not received 
< 
the stock from Digitran as promised. Defendant met with 
Plaintiff at this time and received 32,190 shares of 
Plaintiff's personal stock. Defendant's own testimony as to 
this transaction explained that the delivery of the stock 
was "security for the good faith performance ... by 
Digicrane/Digitran." 
n n i 
CD 
I 
< 
D 
U-
5. A year later, November 22, 1988, Defendant received 
a stock certificate from Digitran for 40,533 shares of 
stock, the amount of stock owed from the prepayment 
agreement. An interest payment was also paid in April 1988 
to Defendant in the amount of $1,824 to compensate him for 
the delay. 
6. Defendant has not returned the 32,190 shares of 
stock given him in 1987 by Plaintiff. He claims they were z 
< 
o 
3 to act as security not only for the 40,533 shares of stock, 
i 
o but to ensure good faith efforts from the company for other 
c difficulties Defendant was having, particularly the payment 
S of royalties from Digicrane. Plaintiff brought this action 
- to recover this stock. 
z 
ui 
j Based on the foregoing findings of fact, the Court sets 
« 
z forth the following: 
to 
g CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
z 
< 
g 1. The Court having determined that Plaintiff's action 
< 
> • 
IJ is based on contract, there is no applicable statute of 
X 
2 limitations barring Plaintiff's complaint. 
° 2. The transaction between the Plaintiff and Defendant 
is reflected in a series of documents and there is 
sufficient question as to why the 32,190 shares of stock 
were transferred to support the admission of other evidence 
explaining the context and understanding of the parties at 
the time of transfer. Consequently, the Court finds as a 
matter of law that exhibit 6, the Irrevocable Stock Power, 
must be construed together with other documents which are in 
evidence and with Defendant's own testimony, and Defendant's 
motion for summary judgment on the basis of the statute of 
frauds must be denied. 
3. The Court having determined that the 32,190 shares 
- of stock given to Defendant by Plaintiff were admittedly 
D 
i given as "security for a good faith performance"; they were 
< 
*• delivered at a time when Digitran had still not delivered 
o 
S the 40,533 shares of stock pursuant to the prepayment 
i 
g agreement; and there was no other obligation at that time 
Z 
»-
{? owed to Defendant; Plaintiff is entitled, as a matter of 
n 
S law, to the return of the stock certificates, or if that is 
UJ 
in 
- not possible, to damages equal the value of said shares, 
z 3 4. The Court has examined the relevant documents and o 
z while it is apparent that Defendant feels he may have a 
en 
g claim for royal t i es , that claim i s not an issue before the 
z 
< 
o Court. Defendant received the stock promised him in the 
< 
>• 
J prepayment agreement and has failed to establish why he is 
i 
12 entitled to retain the other 32,190 shares. Plaintiff is u 
° entitled to judgment as a matter of law since there is no 
< 
genuine issue of material fact at issue in this case. 
DATED this *?th day of Jk6guet, 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was 
mailed, postpaid, to the following this 16th day of August, 
1993: 
CM 
5 George W. Preston 
i Joseph M. Chambers 
H Preston & Chambers 
2- Attorneys for Defendant 
g 31 Federal Avenue 
3 Logan, UT 84321 
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Secretary 
G; • N. Anderson #8800 
Hi^YARD, ANDERSON & OLSEN 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
A T T O R N E Y S A T L-AW 
175 EAST FIRST NORTH 
L O G A N . U T A H 84321 
TELEPHONE (801) 752-2610 
TELEFAX (801) 753-8895 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
L0RETTA PENFOLD RECORDS, 
a/k/a LORETTA GALLENT, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GARY M. BRIGGS, 
ORDER 
Defendant. 
Civil No. 92-01 
Judge Gordon J. Low 
This matter came before this Court on the basis of 
Defendant's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that 
Plaintiff's action is barred by an applicable statute of 
limitations or by an applicable statute of frauds. 
Plaintiff also filed a motion for summary judgment on the 
grounds that Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law based on undisputed facts set forth in Defendant's 
deposition and Plaintiff's affidavit. Oral argument was had 
on both motions on July 27, 1993, at which time the Court 
took the matter under advisement and issued a memorandum 
decision. Based upon the foregoing and good cause 
appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Defendant's motion for summary judgment based on 
statute of limitations be and is hereby denied. 
2. Defendant's motion for summary judgment based on 
the basis of the statute of frauds be and is hereby denied, O-^ 
CO 
00 
I 
< 
H 
D 
3- Plaintiff is entitled, as a matter of law, to the 
return of the 32,190 shares of stock given to Defendant as 
security for a good faith performance, plus any benefit 
received by Defendant while this stock has been in his 
possession; or, if that is not possible, to damages equal to 
the value of said shares, plus any benefits derived 
therefrom. 
4. Plaintiff is awarded judgment as a matter of law z 
< 
o 
S since there is no genuine issue of material fact remaining 
x 
g in this case, and Defendant is hereby ordered to return the 
z 
H 
2 stock plus any benefits received. If this cannot be 
H 
S effected, then Plaintiff shall be granted money damages in 
in 
- an amount to be established upon further order of this 
z* 
kJ 3 Court. 
DATED this /£ day of<3rt*§«rt, 1993. 
o 
« 
z 
o 
1 BY THE COURT: 
z 
< 
6 
< 
hi 
U 
£Lsty:ict Co(tirt Judge 
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I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
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George W. Preston 
Joseph M. Chambers 
Preston & Chambers 
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